Kirtdoll v. State, 114465

Bryon Kirtdoll was convicted of first-degree murder in 2004 and received a "hard 50" life sentence (life with parole eligibility only after 50 years).
His direct appeal (raising an Apprendi challenge to the hard 50) and two earlier K.S.A. 60-1507 collateral attacks were unsuccessful.
In 2013, after Alleyne v. United States, Kirtdoll filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence arguing judicial fact-finding made his hard 50 unconstitutional.
The district court treated the filing both as a motion to correct an illegal sentence (K.S.A. 22-3504) and as a K.S.A. 60-1507 collateral attack, denying relief on both grounds.
The district court and Court of Appeals’ reasoning analogized Alleyne to Apprendi and concluded Alleyne could not be applied retroactively to cases final when Alleyne was decided.
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding Alleyne’s rule is not retroactively applicable to final cases and cannot justify a successive or untimely 60-1507 motion.

Issue	Kirtdoll's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Alleyne invalidates Kirtdoll's hard 50 as unconstitutional judicial fact-finding	Alleyne requires jury findings for facts increasing mandatory minimums, so hard 50 (judge-found) is unconstitutional	Alleyne is not retroactive to cases final at its decision; prior judge-found hard 50 remains valid	Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases final when decided; hard 50 upheld
Whether Kirtdoll could obtain relief via K.S.A. 22-3504 (motion to correct illegal sentence)	His sentence is illegal under Alleyne and thus correctable	K.S.A. 22-3504 does not encompass constitutional sentencing claims like Alleyne	Motion under K.S.A. 22-3504 is not the proper vehicle; claim fails under that statute
Whether Kirtdoll's pleading can proceed as a K.S.A. 60-1507 collateral attack (successive/untimely)	His Alleyne claim is an extraordinary circumstance or shows manifest injustice warranting relief	Alleyne's prospective-only application cannot supply exceptional circumstances or excuse untimeliness for final cases	Treated as 60-1507, Alleyne cannot justify successive or untimely motion; relief denied
Whether Alleyne qualifies for retroactive (Teague) exceptions (including "watershed")	Alleyne is a fundamental change warranting retroactive application	Alleyne is an extension of Apprendi and not a "watershed" rule; Teague exceptions inapplicable	Alleyne is not a Teague watershed rule and does not meet exceptions; no retroactive relief

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. _ (Alleyne requires jury finding of any fact that increases mandatory minimum sentence)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing criminal penalties beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules in collateral review)
Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103 (three-step Kansas analysis for retroactive application of new law in collateral attacks)
State v. Moncla, 301 Kan. 549 (K.S.A. 22-3504 does not encompass constitutional challenges like Alleyne)
State v. Kirtdoll, 281 Kan. 1138 (Kirtdoll’s direct appeal rejecting Apprendi-based challenge to hard 50)
Verge v. State, 50 Kan. App. 2d 591 (Kan. Ct. App. panel analogized Alleyne to Apprendi and held Alleyne not retroactive to final cases)