Kirk Homoky v. City of Hobart, Indiana (mem. dec.), 45A03-1609-MI-2052

Background

Kirk Homoky, a Hobart police officer, was accused of (1) running multiple IDACS checks on his estranged wife (Mattie) and associates for non‑law‑enforcement reasons, and (2) allowing seven incorrectly issued paychecks from his former employer (Stardust Bowl II) to be deposited into a joint account. The Board found Counts I and III proved and dismissed him; Count II was not proven.
HPD Chief sought dismissal; Homoky requested a hearing before the Hobart Board of Public Works and Safety. A four‑day evidentiary hearing occurred; the Board voted to terminate and later adopted written findings. Homoky petitioned for judicial review; the trial court affirmed the Board.
On appeal Homoky raised procedural due‑process challenges (including alleged Board bias, evidentiary exclusions, and alleged jurisdictional defect from the Board issuing written findings after his petition) and argued the Board’s findings lacked substantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals reviewed under the limited administrative‑review standard: whether the Board followed proper procedure and whether findings rest on substantial evidence, without reweighing credibility.
The court found multiple briefing deficiencies by Homoky’s counsel but nevertheless addressed the merits, rejecting claims of actual bias by Mayor Snedecor, upholding evidentiary rulings as within administrative discretion, and finding substantial evidence supporting Counts I and III.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Homoky)	Defendant's Argument (City/Board)	Held
Whether Board hearing was impartial (Mayor Snedecor bias/need to recuse)	Mayor Snedecor participated in investigation and thus was biased; should be deposed/called as witness	Prior investigatory involvement alone does not prove actual bias; no special facts showing intolerable risk of unfairness	Court: No actual bias shown; no due‑process violation; claim waived where underdeveloped
Admissibility/exclusion of proffered evidence at administrative hearing	Excluded evidence (alleged investigator bias, wife’s prior misconduct, discipline of other officers, expert legal conclusions) deprived him of due process	Administrative hearings allow relaxed evidentiary rules; excluded material was irrelevant, propensity or invading Board’s province, or properly limited	Court: Exclusions within hearing officer discretion; no deprivation of due process
Whether Board lost jurisdiction to issue written findings after Homoky filed judicial‑review petition	Filing petition divested Board of jurisdiction to enter required specific findings	Statute requires specific findings; filing petition does not automatically strip Board of jurisdiction to adopt required findings; Homoky failed to object	Court: Board properly adopted written findings at next meeting; argument waived and without authority
Whether findings on Counts I (IDACS misuse) and III (checks) are supported by substantial evidence	Homoky contends he had law‑enforcement purpose for searches and that wife acted alone re: checks	Evidence showed 15 IDACS searches of estranged wife with no law‑enforcement purpose proffered; wife testified she signed some checks with his consent; Board reasonably inferred misuse and conversion	Court: Substantial evidence supports findings and termination; affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Winters v. City of Evansville, 29 N.E.3d 773 (Ind. Ct. App.) (standard of limited review of administrative decisions)
Jandura v. Town of Schererville, 937 N.E.2d 814 (Ind. Ct. App.) (prior investigatory exposure to materials does not automatically disqualify an administrative adjudicator)
Dell v. City of Tipton, 618 N.E.2d 1338 (Ind. Ct. App.) (administrative bodies must afford due process at highest workable level; not all judicial procedural safeguards required)
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (U.S. 1975) (adjudicator’s exposure to investigatory materials denies due process only where intolerable risk of unfairness shown)
King v. City of Gary, 296 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.) (discipline of other officers does not bar prosecution of separate disciplinary action)