Kirk Brand Coburn v. Janet Moreland
433 S.W.3d 809
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- Coburn and Moreland divorced by agreed decree (Feb 2011); named joint managing conservators of daughters E.C. and P.C.; Coburn was unemployed at divorce and child support was set at $600/month while he remained unemployed, to be recalculated upon employment.
- Shortly after divorce Coburn moved to Houston, began receiving substantial financial support from his fiancée/wife (Holly), and declined to seek salaried employment; parties’ relationship and Coburn’s relationship with the children deteriorated.
- Therapists (Drs. Wilcox, Loredo, Sherry) evaluated family, diagnosed Coburn with narcissistic traits and recommended stepwise therapy, limited or supervised visitation, and coordinated counseling; therapists warned against forced visitation.
- Moreland filed to modify child support and to obtain exclusive decision-making rights; Coburn counter-petitioned seeking sole or expanded conservatorship and resisted therapeutic conditions on possession.
- Trial court (1) conditioned Coburn’s standard possession on completion of 25 weeks individual and 25 weeks family therapy (supervised visits and Skype in interim), (2) granted Moreland exclusive educational and certain health decision-making rights, (3) found Coburn voluntarily underemployed, imputed earning capacity of $200,000/yr and net monthly resources of $12,736.11, calculated children’s proven needs at $3,557.50/month and set child support at $2,716.25/month under Tex. Fam. Code §154.126, and (4) awarded Moreland substantial attorney’s fees.
- On appeal the court vacated and dismissed as moot the possession/access restriction (Coburn completed therapy and resumed possession), and affirmed the remainder: exclusive decision-making, child-support increase, and attorney’s-fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Coburn) | Defendant's Argument (Moreland) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court could condition Coburn’s standard possession on 25 weeks of court-ordered counseling and restrict access | Trial court lacked authority to impose less-than-standard possession for joint managing conservator absent statutory basis; order punished only Coburn though both parents contributed to conflict | Trial court had statutory discretion to limit possession when standard possession not in children’s best interest; therapeutic conditions appropriate given expert recommendations | Moot on appeal (Coburn completed therapy); appellate court vacated trial-court possession conditions as moot and dismissed that portion of appeal |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in awarding Moreland exclusive decision-making for education and non-invasive medical/dental care | No evidence supporting denial of Coburn’s participation; insufficient showing of conflict, apathy, or neglect specific to these rights | High-conflict evidence and expert testimony showed parents cannot co-parent; Moreland is primary caretaker and exclusive designation reduces conflict and serves children’s best interest | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion in awarding exclusive rights to Moreland |
| Whether child-support modification (increase to $2,716.25) was proper: voluntary underemployment, needs calculation, guideline deviation, use of voluntary interim payments | Court erred: improper imputation/deviation, miscalculated proven needs, improperly considered interim voluntary payments | Evidence showed change from (assumed) unemployment at divorce to voluntary underemployment; court permissibly applied §154.066 and §154.126 to impute earning capacity, calculate needs, and divide excess; voluntary interim payments were not basis for increase | Affirmed: modification supported by evidence; court properly imputed earning capacity, applied §154.126, and did not base ongoing obligation on voluntary interim payments |
| Whether trial court abused discretion awarding Moreland majority of attorney’s fees | Fees require prevailing-party or good-cause finding; Moreland did not prevail on all requested relief so award improper | Section 106.002 grants broad judicial discretion to award reasonable fees in SAPCR; prevailing-party/good-cause are not statutory prerequisites; Moreland obtained substantial relief protecting children | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion in awarding fees under §106.002; no prevailing-party/good-cause requirement implied |
Key Cases Cited
- Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1990) (standard of review—abuse of discretion—in custody and SAPCR matters)
- Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (§154.066: court may base support on earning potential for intentional underemployment; no extra proof requirement beyond statute)
- Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (mootness and vacatur principles; courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot controversies)
- Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. 2002) (best-interest standard is fact-specific; trial court has broad latitude in conservatorship decisions)
- Garza v. Garza, 217 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006) (upholding exclusive health/education decision-making where parental fitness or conflict warrants it)
- Tex. Fam. Code §154.126 & §154.066 (statutory framework governing guideline application when obligor’s net resources exceed $7,500 and treatment of intentional underemployment)