Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87

Kinney sued Barnes and related entities for defamation in Travis County, seeking a permanent injunction rather than monetary damages.
Kinney’s requested relief included removal of defamatory statements from Barnes’s websites, third-party republisher removals, and a six-month homepage posting of the injunction, a retraction, and apology (later abandoned).
Trial court granted summary judgment for defendant; court of appeals affirmed without addressing defamation merits.
Court analyzes whether a post-trial injunction against future defamatory speech is a constitutional prior restraint under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and First Amendment precedents.
Texas free-speech doctrine generally disfavors prior restraints and treats damages as the appropriate remedy for defamation.
Court ultimately holds that removal of defamatory speech post-adjudication is not a prior restraint, but an injunction prohibiting future similar speech is a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint; damages remain the proper remedy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is a permanent injunction prohibiting future defamatory speech a prior restraint?	Kinney argues it is not a prior restraint.	Barnes argues it is a prior restraint.	Yes, it is a prior restraint.
If it is a prior restraint, is such injunction permissible under the Texas Constitution?	Kinney asserts it should be allowed under free-speech protections.	Barnes contends it must be barred as unconstitutional.	Not permissible under Texas Constitution; violates Article I, Section 8.
Are injunctions the proper remedy for defamation in Texas, or should damages be the exclusive remedy?	Kinney seeks injunctive relief as a remedy for defamation.	Defamation should be addressed with damages, not injunctions.	Damages are generally the proper remedy; injunctions in defamation are disfavored.

Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1992) (prior restraints skeptical; protect speech unless impending danger; equity limits on restraints)
Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.1983) (temporary injunctions against defamatory speech deemed prior restraints)
Ex parte Tucker, 220 S.W.75 (Tex.1920) (abuse of liberty punished, not denial of the right to speak)
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (U.S.1957) (content-based injunctions against future speech may be permissible in limited contexts)
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (U.S.1973) (upheld certain injunctions in commercial/anti-discrimination contexts; not a blanket defamation rule)
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (U.S.1931) (final safeguard against prior restraints; strong presumption against prior restraints)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (U.S.1990) (defamation damages as remedy; speech not shielded from defamation liability)
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (U.S.1971) (speech protections; prior restraints disfavored; government bears burden)
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (U.S.1976) (heavy presumption against prior restraints on publication)