556 F.Supp.3d 680
E.D. Mich.2021Background
- After the 2020 presidential election in Michigan, plaintiffs (Michigan voters and purported Trump electors) filed suit on Nov. 25, 2020 seeking to decertify Michigan’s results and obtain injunctive relief; the amended complaint alleged widespread fraud and attached numerous affidavits and expert reports.
- The district court denied emergency injunctive relief on Dec. 7, 2020, finding multiple independent grounds for dismissal (Eleventh Amendment immunity, laches, standing, mootness, abstention) and that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.
- Plaintiffs appealed and sought certiorari; Michigan’s electors voted Dec. 14, 2020. Plaintiffs did not voluntarily dismiss promptly and continued litigation activity thereafter.
- Defendants and intervenors moved for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s inherent authority, arguing that counsel filed and pressed frivolous claims and relied on affidavits lacking evidentiary support.
- The court held a multi-hour hearing, received supplemental briefing, and concluded plaintiffs’ counsel: presented claims not grounded in law; advanced factual allegations unsupported by admissible evidence (often recycled from other cases or based on speculation); failed to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiry; and multiplied proceedings after the case became moot.
- The court granted sanctions (Rule 11, § 1927, and inherent authority), ordered counsel to pay defendants’ fees and costs, required CLE in pleading standards and election law, and referred counsel to disciplinary authorities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 | Counsel said the case remained viable (initially citing Dec. 8 deadline, later Dec. 14 electors) and actions were timely; changed circumstances justified continued litigation | Counsel and intervenors argued plaintiffs conceded mootness after electors voted; failure to dismiss forced defendants to file motions and wasted resources | Court: Counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied proceedings by not dismissing once relief became unavailable and after court guidance on weak claims |
| Whether Rule 11(b)(2) — legal contentions — was violated (claims warranted by law) | Plaintiffs argued novel or extended theories were appropriate; relied on prior filings and urgent public importance | Defendants argued claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment, laches, standing, mootness and were not supported by nonfrivolous legal authority | Court: Claims were not warranted by existing law nor justified by a nonfrivolous argument to extend law; Rule 11(b)(2) violation found |
| Whether Rule 11(b)(3) — factual contentions — was violated (evidentiary support) | Plaintiffs maintained affidavits and expert reports supported allegations and were submitted in good faith; evidence would be tested through process | Defendants showed affidavits were speculative, recycled from other suits, contradicted by public records, or lacked foundation | Court: Counsel presented factual allegations without reasonable evidentiary support, failed to investigate or question key affiants, and thus violated Rule 11(b)(3) |
| Whether court may award sanctions under its inherent authority and whether counsel acted for improper purpose | Plaintiffs claimed First Amendment and access-to-courts protections; argued Rule 11 procedures should control | Defendants showed counsel pursued politically-motivated agenda, sought to validate conspiracies, and continued litigation for partisan aims despite lack of merit | Court: Inherent-authority sanction appropriate—claims were meritless, counsel knew or should have known, and motive was improper (harassment/political purpose) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997) (§ 1927 standard; counsel may be required to pay excess costs for unreasonable multiplication of proceedings)
- Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (purpose of § 1927 sanctions is to deter dilatory litigation practices and aggressive tactics beyond zealous advocacy)
- Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1986) (standard that attorney should reasonably know claim is frivolous supports sanctions)
- Salkil v. Mount Sterling Twp. Police Dep’t, 458 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2006) (§ 1927 requires more than negligence but less than subjective bad faith)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (central purpose of Rule 11 is deterrence of baseless filings)
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (illustrative discussion of equitable relief in post-election litigation; not authority for decertifying results as plaintiffs sought)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (courts possess inherent authority to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct)
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017) (district courts may award fees under inherent power but only for the portion of fees caused by misconduct)
- BDT Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010) (inherent-authority sanctions may be imposed for bad faith that becomes apparent during litigation)
- Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 1997) (factors for awarding fees under inherent authority: meritlessness, knowledge, improper motive)
- Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (attorney speech in court is highly circumscribed; First Amendment does not protect litigation conduct from professional limitations)