King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 227 N.C. App. 545

King owns a Chapel Hill towing business and sued the Town for declaratory judgment and injunctions seeking to invalidate two ordinances regulating towing and mobile phone use.
The Town enacted a Towing Ordinance (effective May 1, 2012) and a Mobile Phone Ordinance (effective June 1, 2012).
The trial court permanently enjoined enforcement of both ordinances after findings that they violated state law and were preempted by the General Assembly’s mobile-phone regulation.
King alleged the ordinances violated the state constitution and home-rule powers, and that the Town exceeded its police powers under G.S. § 160A-174(a).
The Court of Appeals held the Towing Ordinance was within the Town’s broad police-power authority under § 160A-174(a) when construed under the broad construction mandate of § 160A-4, and reversed the injunction against the Towing Ordinance; it reversed the injunction against the Mobile Phone Ordinance on irreparable-harm grounds, effectively upholding the challenge to the Mobile Phone Ordinance.
The decision leaves unresolved questions about the Mobile Phone Ordinance’s enforceability and indicates that any challenge should be pursued in the context of the individual case rather than via broad injunctive relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Towing Ordinance is valid under the Town’s broad police power under § 160A-174(a).	King argues § 174(a) is either not applicable or too narrow to authorize towing regulation.	Town contends § 174(a) authorizes broad regulation of health, safety, and welfare, and the ordinance falls within that scope.	Yes; § 174(a) is ambiguously broad and should be read with § 160A-4's broad construction; the Towing Ordinance is valid under the Town's police power.
Whether the Towing Ordinance’s fee provisions and notice requirements infringe King’s contract rights or exceed statutory authorization.	King contends fee provisions contravene rights to contract and overstep authority.	Town asserts fee controls and notice requirements are within § 174(a)’s broad regulatory authority for health, safety, and welfare.	Fees and notices are within § 174(a)’s broad scope; no contract-right violation shown.
Whether the Mobile Phone Ordinance constitutes irreparable harm justifying injunctive relief and whether it is properly enforceable.	Plaintiff argues enforcement would irreparably harm tow operations and is necessary for the business.	Lanier/Structural Components controls apply; no immediate irreparable harm shown; enforceability should be tested in the individual case.	No manifest irreparable harm; reversed as to the injunction; challenge should proceed in the individual case.

Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, N.C. , 731 S.E.2d 800 (N.C. 2012) (ambiguous enabling language may trigger broad construction; Dillon’s Rule overruled by §160A-4 for municipalities)
Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 168 N.C. App. 75, 606 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. App. 2005) (section 4’s broad construction applies where language is ambiguous)
Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. 1994) (section 4 broad construction mandate interpreted for municipal powers)
Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 517 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. 1999) (plain-meaning construction when language unambiguous; power limited by express language)
Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 581 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 2003) (supreme court discretion on interpreting local ordinances; limits of authority under §174)
Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 451 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. 1994) (municipal power constrained by express enabling language; plain-meaning approach unless ambiguity exists)