King v. Town of Chapel Hill
367 N.C. 400
| N.C. | 2014Background
- Chapel Hill amended ordinances after public testimony about harms from nonconsensual towing in private lots and enacted a Towing Ordinance (signage/notice, police notification, release/response, storage, payment) including authority to set maximum fees and ban certain charges.
- The Town also enacted a Mobile Phone Ordinance banning use of mobile phones by drivers aged 18+ while the vehicle is in motion on public streets, though the ordinance required an officer to have separate cause to stop the driver before issuing a citation.
- George King, a tow-operator who patrols private lots and must respond to owner calls (often by mobile phone), challenged both ordinances seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing lack of municipal authority and state preemption.
- The trial court enjoined both ordinances, finding the towing statute relied on was an unconstitutional local act and that State law preempted local mobile-phone regulation. The Court of Appeals reversed as to towing (upholding under municipal police-power statute) and rejected King's standing to challenge the phone ordinance pre-enforcement.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide scope of municipal power under N.C.G.S. § 160A-174 to regulate towing and whether State law preempts local regulation of mobile-phone use while driving.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to regulate nonconsensual towing from private lots | King: No sufficient municipal enabling statute; § 20-219.2 is a (possibly unconstitutional) local act and does not authorize municipal regulation | Chapel Hill: § 160A-174 grants broad police power to regulate towing to protect health/safety/welfare | Held: § 160A-174, read broadly, authorizes municipalities to regulate nonconsensual towing (signage, notice, response, release, storage, payment requirements) |
| Validity of municipal fee caps for towing and prohibition on credit-card surcharge | King: Fee caps undercut ability to earn a living and are unrelated to health/safety; unconstitutional/unauthorized interference with right to earn a livelihood | Chapel Hill: Fee limits and payment rules are part of regulatory scheme to protect public welfare and facilitate rapid vehicle recovery | Held: Fee schedule and ban on passing credit-card fees exceed municipal authority and were struck; other towing provisions severed and left in force |
| Standing / ripeness to challenge Mobile Phone Ordinance pre-enforcement | King: Pre-enforcement challenge permitted because ordinance substantially burdens his business (conflict with required towing practices) and creates manifest threat of irreparable harm | Chapel Hill: King lacked standing because he had not been cited; challenge should await enforcement or be raised as defense | Held: King has standing; economic encumbrance on business is a manifest threat of irreparable harm sufficient for equitable relief |
| Preemption of municipal mobile-phone ban by State motor-vehicle statutes | King: State statutes are comprehensive and show intent to preempt local regulation of driver phone use | Chapel Hill: Ordinance supplements safety regulation locally; municipalities have police power under §160A-174 | Held: State has enacted a comprehensive, integrated regulatory scheme regarding mobile-phone use while driving (statutes for under-18, school buses, texting, commercial drivers); municipal ordinance is preempted and invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650 (1965) (municipalities have only powers conferred or necessarily implied by legislature)
- Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362 N.C. 328 (2008) (police-power delegation under §160A-174 and its scope)
- State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764 (1949) (scope and limits of police power; social interest vs. personal liberty)
- Treants Ents., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776 (1988) (regulation of trades/businesses must be rationally related to substantial government purpose)
- Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516 (1957) (right to earn a livelihood is a fundamental interest protected from arbitrary interference)