King v. Smith
5:16-hc-02291
E.D.N.C.Oct 16, 2017Background
- Daniel H. King is a District of Columbia Code offender convicted in D.C. Superior Court and was serving a federal term in the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) when the government initiated civil commitment proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4248.
- King filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging the legality of his civil commitment, arguing the BOP lacked legal custody over him when proceedings began.
- Magistrate Judge Numbers issued an M&R recommending dismissal of King’s § 2241 petition without prejudice; King filed timely objections.
- King argued the magistrate confused parole and supervised release, contended he was scheduled for release on parole (so not in BOP custody), and asserted the D.C. Revitalization Act is not retroactive and therefore did not place him in BOP custody.
- The court reviewed the M&R de novo as to King’s objections, considered Fourth Circuit precedent holding D.C. offenders are in BOP custody for § 4248 purposes, and rejected King’s custody and Revitalization Act arguments.
- The court overruled King’s objections, adopted the M&R, dismissed the petition without prejudice, denied a certificate of appealability, and closed the case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether King was in BOP legal custody when § 4248 proceedings began | King: Not in BOP custody because he was scheduled for parole / was a D.C. Code offender not covered by BOP custody rules | Government: King was a D.C. offender in BOP custody for § 4248 purposes (Revitalization Act and precedent) | King was in BOP custody; § 4248 proceedings were proper |
| Whether the Revitalization Act applies retroactively to King | King: Revitalization Act is not retroactive and thus does not place him in BOP custody | Government: Revitalization Act places D.C. offenders in BOP custody as applied; Fourth Circuit precedent supports application | Revitalization Act applies; King is subject to BOP custody for § 4248 |
| Whether the M&R confused parole with supervised release | King: Magistrate erred by conflating parole and supervised release | Government: No confusion; relevant precedent distinguishes the concepts and supports custody finding | No error; magistrate did not confuse parole and supervised release |
| Certificate of appealability (COA) | King: (implied) entitlement to proceed on appeal | Government: COA not warranted under § 2253(c) standards | COA denied; standards for appealability not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (district courts must review de novo objections to a magistrate judge’s report)
- United States v. Savage, 737 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2013) (D.C. offenders are in BOP legal custody for purposes of § 4248)
- United States v. Broncheay, 645 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing § 4248 in the context of supervised-release terms)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standards governing issuance of a certificate of appealability)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (clarifying COA standards and review of habeas claims)