King v. Ford Motor Co.
872 F.3d 833
7th Cir.2017Background
- LaWanda King, a Ford assembly worker and union member, transferred to Ford’s Chicago plant in 2010 and alleges supervisor sexual remarks in December 2011; she reported the conduct internally and to Ford’s hotline and filed an EEOC charge in March 2012.
- King alleged post-complaint retaliation: reassignment to less desirable tasks, denial of overtime, unpaid hours, and disciplinary actions; she filed two additional EEOC charges in March and April 2013.
- In January 2013 King was suspended for attendance; she then sought medical leave in March 2013 but Ford found her doctor’s paperwork insufficient and issued a contractually mandated 5-Day Quit notice. Ford terminated King on April 2, 2013 for failing to comply with the notice.
- Ford’s time records showed King had worked below the 1,250-hour FMLA eligibility threshold (1,157 hours before the absence; 970 hours before termination).
- At summary judgment, the district court struck a nondisclosed declaration (from union chairman Grant Morton) as a Rule 26 violation, held the Title VII harassment claim time-barred, held King ineligible for FMLA leave, and found insufficient evidence of retaliation; the court then granted summary judgment for Ford and King appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Morton declaration (Rule 26 disclosure) | Morton’s statements were known in discovery and Ford could have deposed him; declaration was necessary to show retaliatory animus. | Morton was not disclosed as a witness; nondisclosure prejudiced Ford and precluded follow-up discovery. | Court properly struck the declaration under Rule 37(c)(1); plaintiff failed to show the nondisclosure was justified or harmless. |
| Timeliness of Title VII sexual-harassment claim | King said she never received the EEOC right-to-sue letter, so the 90-day filing clock never started. | King failed to keep the EEOC informed of her address; constructive receipt starts when delivery was attempted. | Harassment claim is time-barred; constructive receipt applies because the delay was King’s fault. |
| FMLA interference — eligibility | King asserted some AWOLs/discipline were improper and, removing them, she worked ≥1,250 hours and was eligible for FMLA. | Ford’s payroll records show King worked fewer than 1,250 hours; plaintiff must produce specific contrary evidence. | Summary judgment for Ford: King’s conclusory affidavit and late unsworn chart were insufficient to create a triable issue about hours worked. |
| Retaliation (Title VII & FMLA) — causation/pretext | King argued the 5-Day Quit rationale was pretextual and prior complaints / leave led to adverse actions (suspension, termination). | Ford relied on the 5-Day Quit process and absence of evidence linking decisionmakers to retaliatory animus; timing and comparator evidence are weak. | Summary judgment for Ford: No adequate evidence of causation or pretext—large time gaps, lack of comparators, and no statements or facts tying firing to protected activity. |
Key Cases Cited
- David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851 (7th Cir.) (sanction of witness exclusion for Rule 26 nondisclosure is automatic unless justified or harmless)
- Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.) (district-court record citation rules and summary-judgment evidence standards)
- Reschny v. Elk Grove Plating Co., 414 F.3d 821 (7th Cir.) (constructive receipt of EEOC right-to-sue letter when delay is plaintiff’s fault)
- Simpson v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Will Cty., 559 F.3d 706 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff bears burden to prove FMLA eligibility)
- Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir.) (FMLA eligibility requires 1,250 hours worked in prior 12 months)
- Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.) (retaliation causation requires reasonable inference from evidence as whole)
- Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir.) (pretext must show the employer’s stated reason is a lie, not merely incorrect)
- Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654 (7th Cir.) (evidence of pretext alone insufficient without minimal showing tying adverse action to prohibited animus)