443 S.W.3d 838
Tex.2014Background
- Jose Tamez, a welder on a dredging vessel, injured his left arm while helping lift a large socket-wrench assembly used to attach a cutterhead.
- Three crewmen (Tamez, Captain Cordova, Deck Captain Delgado) were sole witnesses; Delgado remembered little; Cordova and Tamez gave differing accounts about whether Tamez was ordered and whether he was holding his torch.
- Tamez sued under the Jones Act, claiming he was injured while following a "specific order," which—if proved—prevents reducing damages for contributory negligence.
- The jury found Tamez was working under a specific order and awarded damages, but also found him 50% at fault; the trial court did not reduce damages because of the specific-order finding.
- At issue on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a last-minute, pre-reading jury-charge objection/definition as untimely; and (2) whether evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Tamez followed a specific order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tamez) | Defendant's Argument (King Fisher) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 272 requires courts to entertain charge objections up to the moment the charge is read | Rule 272 allows courts discretion to set reasonable pre-reading deadlines; trial court acted within discretion | Rule 272 requires objections be accepted up until the charge is read; court had no power to refuse a pre-reading objection | Rule 272 sets an outside limit (must be before reading) but permits trial courts to set an earlier deadline so long as parties get a "reasonable time"; no abuse of discretion here |
| Whether evidence was sufficient that Tamez was following a "specific order" (no reduction for contributory negligence) | The factual record (including Cordova’s testimony) supports that Tamez was ordered to lift in a manner that left him only the options to comply or disobey | Tamez could have set down his torch and lifted with both hands, so he was not under a specific-order that left only compliance or disobedience | Applying the Garza standard and deferential Jones Act sufficiency review, there was some evidence (Cordova’s account) from which reasonable minds could differ; jury finding upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Garza, 371 S.W.3d 157 (Tex. 2012) (defines the "specific order" exception: ordered to do a task in a specific manner or one that can be done only one way)
- State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992) (test for preserving charge-error: timely, plain objection and a ruling)
- Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1998) (Jones Act cases require deferential sufficiency review giving the jury discretion on factual issues)
- Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. 1973) (purpose of Rule 272 is to enable trial courts to submit a proper charge with benefit of counsel’s objections)
- Simeonoff v. Hiner, 249 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2001) (expands specific-orders doctrine to urgent general calls in some circumstances; discussed but not applied)