King Ex Rel. Estate of King v. Kramer
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15618
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- John King, a pretrial detainee awaiting a probable-cause (Gerstein) hearing in April 2007, was tapered off psychotropic medication, isolated for hours, and found dead; his estate sued La Crosse County and jail staff.
- Plaintiff initially litigated under an Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment "deliberate indifference" theory through summary judgment and the first appeal (King I), which returned the case for trial on disputed facts.
- Six weeks before the retrial, plaintiff’s counsel notified defense counsel that current Seventh Circuit law (Ortiz) required applying the Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness standard for pretrial detainees; plaintiff did not notify the court earlier or explain the delay.
- Defendants moved in limine to bar plaintiff from pressing the Fourth Amendment standard as an untimely, new theory; the district court granted the motion, ruling plaintiff had waived the Fourth Amendment claim and ordered trial under the deliberate-indifference standard.
- The jury found defendant nurse Kramer not deliberately indifferent; plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in excluding the correct Fourth Amendment jury instruction and related rulings on evidence.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed: it held the district court abused its discretion by not explaining concrete prejudice to defendants from the late shift and ordered a new trial under proper procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by precluding Fourth Amendment (objective reasonableness) jury instruction and forcing trial under deliberate indifference | King argued Ortiz and related circuit law require Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness for pretrial detainees; the correct standard was raised before trial and should be allowed | Defendants argued the change was a last-minute, untimely "jump-shift," would unfairly prejudice them (experts prepared under a different standard), and therefore was waived | Reversed: district court abused discretion by barring the Fourth Amendment theory without identifying concrete prejudice or considering less drastic remedies; remand for new trial |
| Whether court should have taken judicial notice of HPL–County contract to show delegation of medical authority | King sought judicial notice to treat contract terms as established fact that County delegated medical decision authority to HPL | Defendants opposed; district court declined judicial notice because delegation was disputed and not indisputable | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in refusing judicial notice because delegation was a factual dispute unsuited to Rule 201 |
| Admissibility of indemnification agreement (County–HPL) as evidence of delegation/agency | King argued the indemnification agreement showed County delegated final authority to HPL (admissible to prove agency/control) | Defendants argued Rule 411 and relevance bar admission where primary use was on liability/relationship | Affirmed: exclusion proper; agreement was barred (or its probative value outweighed) given Rule 411 concerns and primary use related to liability/agency |
| Whether plaintiff waived Fourth Amendment claim by litigating under deliberate-indifference for years | Defendants relied on waiver/estoppel principles from failure to timely raise legal theory | Plaintiff argued liberal pleading rules allow shifting legal theories where facts were pleaded and no meaningful prejudice exists | Court: delay was unexplained and problematic but not alone dispositive; waiver not established absent showing of specific prejudice—district court erred by not articulating such prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2012) (earlier appeal reversing summary judgment and framing factual issues)
- Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011) (Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness governs medical care claims by pretrial detainees)
- Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006) (Fourth Amendment applies to detention period before Gerstein probable-cause hearing)
- Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing waiver where plaintiff failed to raise Fourth Amendment standard in prior proceedings)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (U.S. 1962) (leave to amend pleadings should be freely given absent justifying reasons)
- Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004) (district court abuses discretion denying amendment when opponent’s prejudice is only conclusory)