370 N.C. 467
N.C.2018Background
- Plaintiff born Feb 4, 2005; suffered a birth-related brain injury attributed to medical negligence.
- On Jan 10, 2008 the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the minor and the GAL filed a malpractice suit the same day.
- The GAL voluntarily dismissed that 2008 action on Oct 31, 2008.
- On Jan 30, 2015 the trial court reappointed the same GAL and the GAL filed a new malpractice action that day; the trial court dismissed the 2015 action as time-barred.
- The Court of Appeals held § 1-17(b) tolled the statute of limitations until the plaintiff reached age 19, so the claim was timely; the Supreme Court reversed, holding appointment of a GAL removes the disability of minority and starts the limitations period.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appointment of a GAL removes a minor’s disability for statute-of-limitations purposes | § 1-17(b) tolls malpractice claims until the minor turns 19, so GAL appointment does not start the clock | Appointment of a GAL makes the minor represented and therefore removes the disability, starting the limitations period | GAL appointment removes disability of minority and starts the limitations clock |
| Effect of a GAL’s voluntary dismissal on tolling | Dismissal should not defeat tolling under § 1-17(b); the minor still may sue before age 19 | Once the GAL was appointed the statute ran; dismissal does not restart tolling and does not preserve the claim | The statute continued to run after GAL appointment; voluntary dismissal did not reinstate tolling and claim is time-barred |
| Interaction between § 1-17(a) (general disability tolling) and § 1-17(b) (minors’ malpractice exception) | § 1-17(b) is a clear, special rule allowing suit anytime before age 19 regardless of GAL appointment | Appointment of a GAL is a form of removal of the disability under § 1-17(a) and thus triggers the limitations period referenced in § 1-17(b) | Appointment of a GAL removes the disability under § 1-17(a); § 1-17(b)’s time limits apply once disability is removed |
| Whether the Court of Appeals’ reading of § 1-17(b) controls | Argues plain text permits bringing suit anytime before 19 even if a GAL was appointed earlier | Argues longstanding precedent treats a represented minor as able to sue and subjects the ward to the limitations period | The majority follows precedent that a court-appointed GAL requires the ward to comply with ordinary limitations rules |
Key Cases Cited
- First-Citizens Bank & Tr. v. Willis, 257 N.C. 59 (1962) (appointment of guardian starts statute of limitations against infant represented by guardian)
- Rowland v. Beauchamp, 253 N.C. 231 (1960) (once limitations begin to run, a later appointment does not restart tolling)
- Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148 (1964) (appointment of guardian who acts as legal representative starts the statute of limitations for actions the guardian should bring)
- Johnson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 217 N.C. 139 (1940) (failure of guardian to sue in apt time is failure of the ward; bar attaches to the ward)
- White v. Albertson, 14 N.C. 241 (1831) (distinguishing validity of judgments against represented minors versus unrepresented minors)