Kindler v. Horn
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8679
| 3rd Cir. | 2011Background
- Kindler was convicted of murdering a witness and sentenced to death in 1983, with post-verdict motions pending.
- He escaped custody in 1984 and remained a fugitive until recaptured and returned to Pennsylvania in 1991.
- The trial court dismissed his post-verdict motions on account of his escape; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later articulated a new, discretionary review standard.
- Kindler sought PCRA relief; Pennsylvania courts denied based on fugitive forfeiture; federal habeas corpus proceedings followed, with the district court granting relief on some claims.
- The Third Circuit previously held the fugitive forfeiture rule inadequate to bar federal review; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to evaluate adequacy under its Kindler V framework.
- On remand, the court holds that the mandatory rule applied in 1984 was not firmly established and therefore unenforceable to bar federal habeas review; the district court’s habeas grant is affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule adequate to bar habeas review? | Kindler argued the rule was not firmly established or regularly followed. | Commonwealth contends the rule, as applied, barred review and reflected an adequate state ground. | No; rule not firmly established, inadequate to bar review. |
| Was the 1984 rule applied in Kindler's case mandatory rather than discretionary? | Kindler contends the rule was mandatory and novel, breaking from past practice. | Commonwealth argues the rule functioned as a discretionary standard. | Rule was mandatory and novel, not firmly established. |
| Does Kindler V permit review of state rules that are developing case-by-case but not yet settled? | Kindler asserts the rule cannot bar review if not firmly established. | Commonwealth asserts discretionary rules can be adequate grounds. | Discretionary rules can be adequate; however, this rule was not firmly established and thus inadequate. |
| Did the Pennsylvania relaxed waiver approach in capital cases affect the adequacy analysis? | Kindler contends waiver practices were not firmly established to bar review. | Commonwealth may rely on waiver principles to justify dismissal. | Not decisive; adequacy analysis centered on the fugitive forfeiture rule's establishment. |
| Should habeas relief be afforded for the challenged penalty-phase errors given the above? | Kindler preserving claims of instructional error and ineffective assistance. | Commonwealth seeks dismissal or limited review under state grounds. | Habeas relief affirmed in part; district court order remains valid. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 333 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1975) (discretion to hear properly filed appeals when defendant returns to custody)
- Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 476 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1984) (distinction on discretion to reinstate post-fugitive appeals)
- Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1978) (relaxed waiver rule in capital cases)
- Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937 (Pa. 1982) (relaxed waiver rule applied in capital cases)
- Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (waiver and non-waiver considerations in capital cases)
- Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 1996) (firm establishment of state procedural rules; discretion to hear)
- Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) (adequacy requires rules to be firmly established and regularly followed)
- Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991) (nonuniversal waiver rules in capital cases)