Kimbrough v. State
300 Ga. 516
Ga.2017Background
- Benny Kimbrough was convicted in 2006 of malice murder for a July 2004 killing and, based on a 1994 Florida kidnapping conviction, was sentenced under OCGA § 17-10-7(b) to life without parole.
- The sentence was imposed as a recidivist life-without-parole term for a defendant with a prior out-of-state conviction that would be a "serious violent felony" in Georgia.
- Kimbrough appealed and this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal in 2007.
- In 2015 Kimbrough filed a motion to vacate his life-without-parole sentence as void, arguing Georgia law at the time did not authorize life without parole for murder absent the State having sought the death penalty (or under the applicable statutory scheme).
- The trial court denied the motion; Kimbrough appealed and this Court reviewed whether recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 17-10-7(b) validly authorized life without parole for his 2004 murder.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kimbrough's life-without-parole sentence is void under Funderburk reasoning | Kimbrough: Funderburk (invalid life-without-parole where statute excluded capital felonies) renders his sentence void | State: Sentence was imposed under § 17-10-7(b) (recidivist provision) which does authorize life without parole for murder when predicate conviction exists | Held: Sentence valid — Funderburk concerned § 17-10-7(c), not § 17-10-7(b); (b) authorized life without parole here |
| Whether pre-2009 case law (Ingram and similar opinions) requires the State to have sought the death penalty before life without parole could be imposed for murder | Kimbrough: Broad language in Ingram/related cases means life without parole was available only if death penalty was sought | State: Those decisions did not control recidivist sentencing under § 17-10-7(b); Ortiz and statutory text govern | Held: Rejected Kimbrough — recidivist statute controls and permits life without parole without death-penalty filing |
| Whether prior decisional language (Ingram) should invalidate recidivist LWOPs | Kimbrough: Prior statements create a contrary rule that voids his sentence | State: This Court has distinguished Ingram and upheld recidivist LWOPs (Ortiz, Velazquez) | Held: To the extent some cases could be read to preclude recidivist LWOPs, that reading is disapproved; statute controls |
| Right to jury sentencing hearing under OCGA § 17-10-2(c) for mandatory LWOP | Kimbrough: § 17-10-2(c) required a jury sentencing hearing before imposing LWOP | State: When LWOP is mandatory under § 17-10-7, no jury sentencing hearing right attaches | Held: No right to jury sentencing hearing where § 17-10-7 makes LWOP mandatory |
Key Cases Cited
- Funderburk v. State, 276 Ga. 554 (recidivist § 17-10-7(c) discussion; vacated LWOP where (c) did not authorize it)
- Ingram v. State, 266 Ga. 324 (1996) (language suggesting LWOP should be considered only when death penalty is sought)
- Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752 (1996) (upheld recidivist LWOP under § 17-10-7(b))
- Velazquez v. State, 283 Ga. 206 (2008) (rejected applying Ingram to recidivist sentencing; statutory scheme controls)
- Williams v. State, 291 Ga. 19 (2012) (discussed pre-2009 availability of LWOP and Ingram's language)