Kimberly Meador v. Apple, Incorporated
911 F.3d 260
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2013 Ashley Kubiak received a text while driving an iPhone 5, looked down, then crashed; two adults died and a child was paralyzed. Kubiak was criminally convicted of two counts of criminally negligent homicide.
- Victims’ representatives sued Apple in federal court (Texas-law claims) asserting negligence and strict products liability for Apple’s failure to implement a patented "lock-out mechanism" and to warn about distracted-driving risks.
- Plaintiffs alleged that receipt of a notification causes an "unconscious and automatic, neurobiological compulsion" to text, making the phone a substantial cause of the crash; they supported this with studies and a proposed expert report.
- Apple moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted dismissal with prejudice and denied leave to amend. Plaintiffs appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether, under Texas law, a smartphone-induced neurobiological response can be a cause in fact (a "substantial factor") of a user’s tortious act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a smartphone’s induced neurobiological response can be a "substantial factor" (cause in fact) in a user’s torts under Texas law | The phone’s notification triggers an automatic compulsion to text, so the device substantially caused the crash | Texas law does not recognize induced neurobiological responses to a device as a legally cognizable substantial factor; this would be a novel extension of law | No — Texas law would not recognize "neurobiological compulsion" from a phone as a substantial factor; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether plaintiffs’ claims survive Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards | Allegations and expert support sufficiently plead causation and product liability/negligence | Allegations assert a novel theory of causation beyond existing Texas precedents and thus fail to state a claim | No — complaint fails to state a claim; amendment denied as futile |
| Whether issues of concurrent or superseding causation control | Phone and driver negligence were concurrent causes | Even if concurrent causation argued, the phone cannot be a legally recognized cause, so those doctrines are irrelevant | Not reached — because phone cannot be a cause in fact under Texas law, concurrent/superseding causation need not be decided |
| Whether federal court should predict Texas law and create new liability | Plaintiffs urge extrapolation of Texas law to recognize new cause theory | Court should not innovate state law; Erie requires state law or clear direction from state high court/legislature | Court declines to create this novel cause-in-fact theory under Erie; defers to state courts/legislature |
Key Cases Cited
- Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995) (distinguishes proximate cause and producing cause and defines cause in fact as "substantial factor")
- Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991) (quotes Restatement on meaning of "substantial" cause as a practical test)
- City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1987) (explains causation inquiry requires weighing policy considerations)
- El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) (recognition of dram-shop liability as judicial development of Texas law)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2007) (addresses producing cause and its relation to strict liability)