Kimberly McLaughlin v. Suzan McLaughlin
240 Ariz. 560
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Kimberly and Suzan, a same-sex couple married in California (2008), agreed both would parent a child conceived by Kimberly via anonymous artificial insemination; Kimberly gave birth to E. in 2011.
- The couple executed a joint parenting agreement and mirror wills declaring equal parental rights; Suzan stayed home and cared for E. for about two years.
- Relationship broke down; Kimberly left with E., cut off Suzan’s contact, and Suzan filed for dissolution and parenting orders in 2013.
- The trial judge stayed the case pending Obergefell; after Obergefell, the judge ruled the marital presumption of parenthood applied to Suzan and treated the matter as a dissolution with children.
- The judge further held Kimberly could not rebut that presumption under A.R.S. § 25-814(C); Kimberly sought special-action relief challenging those rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Kimberly's Argument | Suzan's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 25-814(A)(1)’s marital paternity presumption applies to a non-biological female spouse in a same-sex marriage | § 25-814 is a gendered "paternity" statute; only the biological mother has parental rights and the statute cannot make Suzan a parent | Obergefell requires gender-neutral application of marriage-related benefits; the presumption must apply equally to same-sex spouses | The court applied § 25-814(A)(1) gender-neutrally in light of Obergefell and held Suzan is presumptively a legal parent |
| Whether § 25-501 creates parental status for a non-biological spouse who agreed to insemination | § 25-501 implies parental rights for the spouse who agreed to insemination | § 25-501 is a support statute and does not itself create "legal parent" status; § 25-814 supplies the marital presumption | Court rejected using § 25-501 to create parental status; § 25-814 provides the basis for presumed parenthood |
| Whether the rebuttal provision (§ 25-814(C)) can be applied to prevent a same-sex spouse from rebutting the marital presumption | Kimberly: § 25-814 is about paternity/fatherhood and rebuttal may be limited to biological male spouses; gender-differentiated treatment can be permissible (Nguyen) | Suzan: equal protection and Obergefell require that the presumption and its consequences be applied equally | Court declined to decide the broader constitutional contours of rebuttal but held Kimberly is estopped from rebutting on equitable grounds in this case |
| Whether Kimberly is precluded (estopped) from rebutting the presumption given prior agreements and conduct | Kimberly: argues she can rebut presumption despite prior agreements | Suzan: points to written agreement, wills, and her role caring for E. — Kimberly induced reliance | Court found equitable estoppel: Kimberly’s prior agreement and conduct (including waivers and representations) and Suzan’s reliance preclude Kimberly from rebutting the presumption |
Key Cases Cited
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex couples have fundamental right to marry; marriage benefits must be equal)
- Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental)
- Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage protected as a fundamental right)
- Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upheld gender-differentiated citizenship rules where biologically justified)
- Lincoln v. Holt, 215 Ariz. 21 (App. 2007) (standards for accepting special-action jurisdiction)
- Adrian E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 240 (App. 2016) (statutory interpretation and constitutional avoidance principles)
- Hurt v. Superior Court, 124 Ariz. 45 (1979) (purpose of paternity statutes is securing child support)
- Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196 (App. 1990) (marital presumption supports family preservation)
- Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 2004) (equitable estoppel can bar rebuttal of marital paternity presumption where reliance and harm exist)