Kimberly McLaughlin v. Hon. jones/suzan McLaughlin
CV-16-0266-PR
| Ariz. | Sep 19, 2017Background
- Kimberly and Suzan, a legally married same-sex couple, agreed that Kimberly would be artificially inseminated; Kimberly gave birth in 2011. Suzan was actively parenting the child until the relationship broke down and Kimberly cut off contact.
- During the pregnancy the parties executed a joint parenting agreement and wills recognizing Suzan as a co-parent; after birth Suzan stayed home to care for the child.
- Suzan filed for dissolution and for legal decision-making/parenting time; the trial court treated the case as a dissolution with children, finding Suzan was a presumptive parent under A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(1).
- Kimberly sought to challenge applying § 25-814(A)(1) to a female spouse and sought review after the court applied Obergefell and Pavan to conclude same-sex spouses must receive marriage-linked benefits equally.
- The court of appeals denied relief; this Court granted review to resolve whether the marital paternity presumption applies to similarly situated same-sex spouses and whether Kimberly could rebut that presumption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McLaughlin) | Defendant's Argument (Jones/Suzan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(1) applies to a female same-sex spouse | Statute uses male‑specific language ("father," "he," "man"), so it applies only to husbands in opposite‑sex marriages | Obergefell and Pavan require states to afford same-sex couples the same marriage-linked benefits; the presumption is a marriage benefit and must be applied gender‑neutrally | The presumption is a marriage‑linked benefit and, consistent with Obergefell and Pavan, applies to similarly situated same‑sex spouses (extended to include Suzan) |
| Whether the statute’s purpose is merely biological identification | The statute concerns biological parentage and thus differences in biology justify gendered wording | The presumption governs legal parentage (not only biology); husbands can be presumed parents even when not biological (e.g., anonymous donor) | The presumption addresses legal parentage and is not limited to biological identification; Nguyen inapplicable here |
| Appropriate remedial response to a statute that discriminates on sex | Court should not rewrite statute; legislature should fix any defects | Courts may either invalidate or extend a benefit; remedial choice should follow statute’s purpose; extension usually preferred | Court must choose remedy; extension to include same‑sex spouses best serves statute’s purposes (support and family stability) |
| Whether Kimberly may rebut Suzan’s presumptive parentage | Kimberly argues § 25‑814(C) allows rebuttal by clear and convincing evidence | Equitable estoppel prevents a birth parent from repudiating representations that another relied on to the other's detriment | Kimberly is equitably estopped from rebutting Suzan’s presumptive parentage given the parties’ agreement, conduct, and Suzan’s reliance |
Key Cases Cited
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same‑sex couples entitled to the constellation of benefits linked to marriage)
- Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (states must afford same‑sex spouses the same parentage/birth‑certificate treatment as opposite‑sex spouses)
- Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (courts have remedial choice: extend statute or abrogate benefit when equal‑protection violation exists)
- Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (benefit characterization of state presumptions and remedial considerations)
- Sessions v. Morales‑Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (remedial framework and deference to statute’s purpose in equal‑protection fixes)
- Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (distinguishes cases involving biological parentage proof)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (constitutional supremacy over statutes)