Kimberly Diei v. Randy Boyd, 116 F.4th 637

Background

Kimberly Diei, a pharmacy student at the University of Tennessee, was investigated twice by the school's Professional Conduct Committee for her social media posts made under a pseudonym, which she alleges did not identify her as a student or mention the College.
The Committee initially found her posts “sexual,” “crude,” and “vulgar,” but did not expel her following the first complaint; after a second complaint, the Committee voted to expel her, though her expulsion was later reversed on appeal by the Dean.
Diei filed a federal lawsuit against the University, its President, Trustees, and Committee Chair, asserting First Amendment violations and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages.
The district court dismissed her claims, finding her requests for injunctive and declaratory relief moot upon graduation and that the policies were neither overbroad nor vague; the court also found her posts unprotected by the First Amendment, that no actionable injury occurred due to the reversal of expulsion, and that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered only Diei’s damages claims, assessed the sufficiency of her pleadings, and reviewed which exhibits could be considered at the motion to dismiss stage.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Diei’s social media posts protected by the First Amendment?	Her posts were off-campus, under a pseudonym, unrelated to school, and caused no disruption.	The school has a legitimate pedagogical interest in regulating student professionalism, including out-of-school conduct.	Diei plausibly alleged her speech was protected and did not disrupt school or relate to her studies.
Was there an adverse action sufficient to chill speech?	The investigation, expulsion, and threat of discipline would chill a person of ordinary firmness.	Expulsion was reversed on appeal, so there was no lasting adverse action.	Immediate expulsion, even if later reversed, plausibly constitutes an adverse action likely to chill speech.
Are defendants entitled to qualified immunity?	Precedent clearly established Diei’s right to engage in protected speech not interfering with educational interests.	Relevant law was not clearly established at the specific level required, and thus officials are immune.	At this Rule 12(b)(6) stage, based on Diei's allegations, no qualified immunity; rights were clearly established by precedent.
Can materials outside the complaint be considered at the motion to dismiss stage?	Only documents central to the complaint and not in dispute should be allowed; she was not given the policies at issue.	Attached policies and pledges can be considered as evidence of fair notice.	Court may not rely on disputed or extraneous materials not central or referred to in complaint; limited proper scope.

Key Cases Cited

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (students retain First Amendment rights at school)
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (university cannot punish students merely for offensive content if no disruption)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (First Amendment applies equally online and offline)
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 594 U.S. 180 (schools' authority to regulate off-campus speech is diminished)
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (universities need a legitimate pedagogical basis to restrict student speech)