292 So.3d 190
La. Ct. App.2020Background
- On May 3, 2018, Kimberly Bryant slipped and fell in a bathroom at Ray Brandt Dodge while carrying an unlidded cup of coffee; she claimed neck, shoulder, and back injuries.
- After the fall she observed several small, clear "puddles" or damp spots on the floor but testified she did not see any substance before she fell and could not confirm they were water.
- An employee (Hollingsworth) testified she used the same bathroom about five minutes before the fall and saw no liquid; after the fall she observed only spilled coffee on the floor.
- Facility cleaning contractor (PM Maintenance) stated it finished cleaning by 5:00 a.m. and the floors were dry when they left.
- Ray Brandt moved for summary judgment under La. R.S. 9:2800.6, arguing plaintiff could not prove actual or constructive notice; the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Bryant’s claims with prejudice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did a condition exist that presented an unreasonable risk of harm? | Bryant: the floor had drying puddles consistent with recent mopping, creating an unreasonable risk. | Ray Brandt: no evidence of any hazardous substance on the floor before the fall; pictures show no water. | Held: No – plaintiff’s testimony was speculative and insufficient to prove an unreasonably dangerous condition. |
| Did defendant have actual or constructive notice or create the condition? | Bryant: constructive notice because floors were mopped earlier and could have remained damp; alternatively, an employee may have dripped water at sink. | Ray Brandt: cleaning crew left by 5:00 a.m. with dry floors; employee saw nothing five minutes earlier; plaintiff has no evidence of timing or source. | Held: No – plaintiff failed to show the condition existed long enough to put defendant on notice or that defendant created it. |
| Does the dealership area at issue fall within the statutory definition of "merchant" under La. R.S. 9:2800.6? | Bryant: analogizes to Landry — service areas may not be within the statute because they may not sell goods there. | Ray Brandt: dealership sells goods/services and falls within the merchant definition. | Held: Court did not decide merchant-status; summary judgment affirmed on alternative grounds (lack of notice/unsafe condition) applicable under either statute. |
Key Cases Cited
- White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 699 So.2d 1081 (La. 1997) (constructive notice requires proof the condition existed long enough that the merchant should have discovered it)
- Bufkin v. Felipe's, 171 So.3d 851 (La. 2014) (risk-utility factors for determining whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous)
- Pizani v. Progressive Ins. Co., 719 So.2d 1086 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1998) (de novo standard for appellate review of summary judgment)
- Tomaso v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 174 So.3d 679 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2015) (insufficient evidence of condition/notice defeats slip-and-fall claim)
- Landry v. Leson Chevrolet Co., Inc., 250 So.3d 360 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2018) (discusses when dealership service areas may or may not fall within La. R.S. 9:2800.6 merchant definition)