Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp.
243 Cal. App. 4th 1366
Cal. Ct. App. 2nd2016Background
- In 2010 William Kim lost control of his 2005 Toyota Tundra and suffered serious injuries; plaintiffs alleged the Tundra was defectively designed because it lacked electronic stability control (ESC/VSC).
- Plaintiffs sued multiple Toyota entities asserting strict products liability (design defect), negligence, and warranty claims; negligence and warranty claims were voluntarily dismissed pretrial.
- Before trial plaintiffs moved in limine to exclude any evidence comparing the Tundra to competitor vehicles or industry custom (seeking to bar all evidence of industry practice); the trial court denied the motion.
- At trial plaintiffs relied on experts to say ESC would have prevented the accident and put on testimony that Toyota engineers recommended making VSC standard; Toyota introduced evidence about industry practice (that ESC was not standard on full-size pickups in 2005).
- Jury was instructed on the Barker risk–benefit test (CACI No. 1204) but not the consumer expectations test; the jury found no design defect and the court entered judgment for Toyota.
- On appeal the court affirmed, holding industry custom evidence may be admissible in strict products liability risk–benefit cases depending on relevance and purpose, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings, instruction refusals, or time-limiting rebuttal argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of industry custom/practice evidence in strict products liability (design-defect) cases | Kims: industry custom is irrelevant and always inadmissible to prove absence of defect; it would improperly inject negligence concepts. | Toyota: industry practice and standards are relevant to risk–benefit balancing (feasibility, alternatives, consequences) and may rebut plaintiff theories. | Court: Evidence of industry custom/practice is not per se inadmissible; admissibility depends on nature and purpose and is subject to Evidence Code §352. Motion in limine to exclude all such evidence was properly denied. |
| Refusal to give instruction that compliance with FMVSS/industry custom "is no defense" | Kims: jury should be instructed that compliance with FMVSS or industry practice is not a defense so jurors apply risk–benefit properly. | Toyota: compliance/noncompliance may be relevant; instruction asserting it is “no defense” is misleading/argumentative. | Court: Trial court properly refused the plaintiffs’ proposed instruction as misleading and argumentative; a balanced instruction explaining such evidence is relevant but non-dispositive would be appropriate. |
| Exclusion of three PowerPoint exhibits (purporting to show VSC effectiveness and internal recommendations) | Kims: exhibits show Toyota’s awareness and internal recommendations; they were authenticated by production in discovery. | Toyota: exhibits unauthenticated, hearsay, confusing, and prejudicial; probative value low. | Court: Exclusion affirmed—lack of authentication, hearsay concerns, technical/confusing content, and §352 prejudice outweighed probative value. |
| Refusal to instruct on consumer expectations test | Kims: consumer expectations instruction should have been given. | Toyota: ESC is a complex, technical system outside ordinary consumer expectations; issue is for risk–benefit analysis. | Court: Consumer expectations test inapplicable to complex electronic safety system; refusal to give that instruction was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413 (Cal. 1978) (adopts risk–benefit test for design defect and lists relevant balancing factors)
- Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548 (Cal. 1994) (explains consumer expectations vs. risk–benefit tests; complex products often require risk–benefit analysis)
- Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121 (Cal. 1972) (strict liability need not require proof of "unreasonably dangerous" design tied to negligence)
- Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal.3d 987 (Cal. 1991) (state-of-the-art evidence admissible in strict liability failure-to-warn cases)
- Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (earlier line excluding industry custom evidence under strict liability principles)
- Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (held evidence of industry custom/standards inadmissible in design-defect context; court discusses limits)
- Howard v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 203 Cal.App.4th 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (held industry technical standards may be considered under risk–benefit analysis)
- Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc., 191 Cal.App.4th 1298 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (trial court has §352 discretion to exclude evidence of regulatory compliance)
- O'Neill v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., 147 Cal.App.4th 1388 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (discusses corporate authorization for statements and related hearsay rules)