Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp.
237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205
Cal.2018Background
- In 2010 William Jae Kim lost control of his 2005 Toyota Tundra and became a quadriplegic; he and his wife sued Toyota under strict products liability alleging the Tundra was defectively designed because Vehicle Stability Control (VSC) was not standard equipment.
- VSC was available on the Tundra only as part of an optional package; experts testified VSC likely would have prevented the accident and would have cost Toyota ~$300–$350 per vehicle to add.
- At trial both sides introduced industry evidence: plaintiffs elicited testimony that competitors did not make VSC standard on pickup trucks and that SUVs commonly had standard VSC; Toyota elicited testimony about industry ‘‘phase in’’ practices for new safety tech.
- The jury was instructed under the Barker risk-benefit test and found no design defect; plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting industry custom/practice evidence.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed under a ‘‘middle ground’’ rule permitting industry custom evidence when relevant to risk-benefit factors; the Supreme Court granted review on that narrow question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of industry custom/practice evidence in strict products liability (risk-benefit) | Kim: such evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial because it invites a ‘‘everyone does it’’ standard-of-care defense and should be excluded | Toyota: industry practice is relevant to feasibility, cost, and trade-offs under Barker and helps evaluate whether the design embodies excessive preventable danger | Evidence of industry custom/practice is admissible if relevant to causation or Barker factors and not substantially outweighed by prejudice or confusion; trial court has gatekeeping discretion and must give limiting instruction on request |
| Whether industry compliance is a complete defense | Kim: industry compliance should not be used to show absence of defect | Toyota: compliance is evidence bearing on safety of design | Compliance is not a complete defense but may be considered as one factor in risk-benefit balancing |
| When industry custom is irrelevant | Kim: ‘‘true custom’’ (nobody does it or everybody does it) is indistinguishable from negligence evidence and always inadmissible | Toyota: even ‘‘true custom’’ can reflect legitimate industry balancing and thus be probative | Not categorically inadmissible; admissibility turns on whether other manufacturers’ choices reasonably reflect independent research/experience balancing safety, cost, functionality |
| Trial court duties when admitting such evidence | Kim: court should have excluded evidence and given a limiting instruction as requested | Toyota: admission was proper; evidence illuminated design decisionmaking and phase-in practice | Trial court must apply ordinary evidence rules (relevance, Evid. Code §352 exclusion) and, on timely request, give limiting instruction restricting jury use of the evidence (Evid. Code §355) |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413 (1978) (establishes consumer-expectations and risk-benefit tests for design defect)
- Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548 (1994) (discusses strict liability focus on product condition and jury use of expert guidance under Barker)
- Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal.App.3d 372 (1979) (earlier appellate rule excluding industry custom evidence in strict liability cases)
- Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757 (1981) (held industry custom not appropriate for risk-benefit analysis)
- Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (2006) (affirmed exclusion of industry-comparison statistics under Barker)
- Howard v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 203 Cal.App.4th 403 (2012) (held compliance with industry standards may be considered in risk-benefit analysis)