447 S.W.3d 480
Tex. App.2014Background
- Killingsworth contends DHA offered him a CEO contract but DHA later blocked him from assuming duties due to political pressure.
- November 21, 2006 letter stated terms were nonbinding unless signed by the Chairman and approved by the Board; start date January 3, 2007.
- Board did not definitively approve the contract; December 5 meeting deferred, December 19 minutes show no final approval.
- Interlocutory appeal addressed whether the letter was properly executed for immunity purposes; later discovery occurred in the trial court.
- DHA moved for summary judgment; trial court granted judgment for DHA; Killingsworth pursued claims under breach of contract, §1983, and §1981.
- Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding no valid contract existed, and thus no due process or racial-discrimination liability; discovery-related issues were properly decided.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract valid existence | Killingsworth argues letter approved by Board created a binding contract. | DHA contends Board did not approve after presentation; no binding contract. | Contract not valid; summary judgment for DHA proper. |
| §1983 due process viability | Killingsworth had a property interest created by the contract; due process required process. | No valid contract means no protected property interest; due process not triggered. | No §1983 due process liability; summary judgment proper. |
| §1981 race-discrimination viability | DHA retained Lott due to race; discrimination alleged. | Proffered nondiscriminatory reasons supported; no proof of discriminatory motive. | No genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment upheld. |
| Discovery before summary judgment | Desire to complete discovery and depose witnesses before ruling. | Adequate discovery occurred; no abuse of discretion. | No abuse; no continuance required; judgment affirmed. |
| Protection order and executive-session discovery | Protective order improperly limited discovery of executive-session deliberations. | Protective order properly limited questioning about deliberations; content outside scope. | Protection order proper; even if error, non-harmful given disposition. |
Key Cases Cited
- Holloway v. Dekkers, 380 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (traditional vs no-evidence MSJ standards; burden-shifting guidance)
- Paragon Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Larco Constr., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007) (elements of breach-of-contract claim)
- Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011) (contract interpretation and meaning; give meaning to every term)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1983) (prima facie case framework for discrimination claims)
- Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (McDonnell Douglas framework; burden shifting)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (pretext and retaliation standards in discrimination cases)
- Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1986) (law-of-the-case doctrine limitations and exceptions)
- TrueStar Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 323 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (immaterial fact issues will not defeat summary judgment)