Kiker v. PROBATE COURT OF MOBILE COUNTY, 67 So. 3d 865

Christopher A. Kiker died in 2005; Kimberly R. Kiker was appointed administratrix of his estate in 2006 with court-approved prohibition on settlements without probate court approval.
In 2007 Kiker filed a wrongful-death action against Christopher's physician; McGlothren represented Kiker under a contingency-fee agreement of 50% of gross recovery plus expenses.
Settlement of the wrongful-death action occurred in 2009 for $150,000; probate court did not approve the settlement prior to execution.
In June 2009, Kiker petitioned for final settlement and sought fees totaling $111,087.75 under the contingency fee agreement; exhibits detailed the fee split and expenses.
November 24, 2009 probate order approved the settlement but mis-stated the total and awarded fees/expenses below the contract amount; December 22, 2009 amended order awarded $73,678.80 to McGlothren and $19,365.80 to Robson, with distributions to Kiker and her minor children.
Kiker sought mandamus relief; the Alabama Supreme Court remanded for a reasoned decision, holding the order failed to apply 12-factor criteria and lacked explanation, and directed a remand with instructions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the fee award was properly reasoned under Pharmacia/Van Schaack criteria	Kiker argues the order lacks Pharmacia criteria application.	Probate court contends it exercised discretion without explicit factor-by-factor articulation.	Remanded for detailed explanation applying Pharmacia factors.
Whether the award amount and attribution to attorney fees were clearly calculated	Kiker asserts the award lacks a basis for the exact attorney-fee attribution to McGlothren and Robson.	Robust justification was not provided for amounts; amounts are unclear.	Remanded to articulate calculation and reasons for amounts.
Whether the remand scope was exceeded by modifying prior orders	Kiker contends the remand limited to explaining the fee award, not altering amounts.	Probate court altered the awards on remand, exceeding the mandate.	Second remand required to comply with initial mandate; avoid further modification.

Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So.2d 549 (Ala. 2004) (guides reasonableness factors for attorney-fee awards)
Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So.2d 740 (Ala.1988) (factors to determine reasonableness of fees)
Ex parte Peck, 572 So.2d 427 (Ala.1990) (trial court may reduce agreed-upon fees if unreasonable)
Ex parte Edwards, 727 So.2d 792 (Ala.1998) (remand judgments must be implemented strictly per mandate)
Beal Bank v. Schilleci, 896 So.2d 395 (Ala.2004) (12-factor considerations are not exhaustive for fee reasonableness)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (S. Ct. 1983) (proper framework for calculating reasonable fees)
State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So.2d 893 (Ala.2002) (review of fee determinations within trial court discretion)
City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810 So.2d 667 (Ala.2001) (need for meaningful appellate review of fee decisions)
American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasizes need for articulating fee calculations)