200 F. Supp. 3d 520
E.D. Pa.2016Background
- Plaintiff Stanley Kieffer worked as a supervisor for CPR Restoration & Cleaning Service, LLC (the Partnership) and later for CPR Restoration, Inc. (the Corporation); both entities are owned by Michael Fingerman but operate from separate locations with separate tax IDs.
- Kieffer suffers from chronic medical conditions and sustained a right-shoulder injury at work on August 30, 2013; WorkHealth restricted lifting, overhead activity, and driving.
- Kieffer took medical leave, was terminated by Partnership supervisor Fickenscher in November 2013, filed an EEOC charge, then was hired by the Corporation in January 2014 and later told the company would not pay promised relocation expenses in mid-2014.
- Kieffer alleges violations of the FMLA, the ADA and PHRA (discrimination, failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, and retaliation), workers’ compensation retaliation, and common-law retaliation; defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- The court found the Partnership and Corporation were not a single employer under either the integrated- or joint-employer tests, dismissed the FMLA claim, and granted summary judgment on all remaining claims for failure to establish qualification, reasonable accommodation, or causation for retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were Partnership and Corporation a single "employer" for FMLA coverage? | Entities should be treated as joint/integrated employers (common management, shared personnel). | Entities are separate: different locations, tax IDs, largely independent labor decisions; only common factor is owner Fingerman. | Not a single employer under integrated or joint tests; FMLA claim dismissed. |
| Was Kieffer a "qualified individual" under ADA/PHRA after 2013 shoulder injury? | Physical aspects of supervisor role were not essential or could be accommodated (driver or leave). | Physical labor is an essential function; Kieffer could not perform them even with driver; requested leave was indefinite. | Kieffer was not qualified; discrimination, hostile-work-environment, and failure-to-accommodate claims from 2013 dismissed. |
| Was there ADA/PHRA retaliation (2013 termination or 2014 adverse acts) causally connected to protected activity? | Temporal proximity and employer comments show retaliatory motive after accommodation request and EEOC charge. | Timing and remarks are insufficient; lack of direct evidence or unusually suggestive proximity; entities are separate. | No sufficient causation; ADA/PHRA retaliation claims dismissed. |
| Did employer unlawfully retaliate for workers’ compensation claim? | Temporal proximity and alleged animus support retaliation inference. | Partnership assisted with benefits and did not impede claim; no circumstantial evidence of animus. | Insufficient causation or animus; workers’ compensation retaliation claim dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330 (procedural standard for summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment: genuine issue standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden-shifting)
- Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Mktg., L.L.C., 425 F.3d 193 (integrated-employer factors)
- Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471 (economic-reality approach to employer status)
- Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Probation and Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (economic reality in employment control analysis)
- Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494 (ADA retaliation prima facie elements)
- Marra v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286 (circumstantial evidence and timing for causation in retaliation claims)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation context)