Kidd -vs- Hardy, 1:11-cv-06839

Kidd petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the court denies the petition.
Kidd was convicted in 1987 in Illinois state court of arson and ten murders related to a fire that killed ten children.
Kidd was sentenced to death; on direct appeal the Illinois Supreme Court remanded for a retrial, and Kidd again was convicted and sentenced to death with standby counsel.
Kidd again appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court; his death sentence was affirmed; in 1996 he filed a pro se post-conviction petition.
In 2003 Kidd’s capital sentence was commuted to life; appellate review continued in Illinois, with a PLA denial in 2010; Kidd filed the federal petition on September 28, 2011.
The district court applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) standards requiring denial unless the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable factual determination; the court denies the petition in its entirety.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Formal fitness hearing required for pro se waiver	Kidd asserts trial court failed to hold a formal fitness hearing.	Respondent argues Claim 1 is defaulted or merits fail.	Claim 1 defaulted; if reached, merit lacking.
Knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel	Kidd argues waiver was not knowing and voluntary.	Record shows Kidd understood and voluntarily waived counsel.	Waiver was knowingly and intelligently made; no merit.
Ineffective assistance tied to alleged prior counsel's conduct	Former counsel provided false information leading to interrogation/confession.	No ineffective assistance proven; no prejudice established.	No reversible error; petition denied on this claim.

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competence to waive counsel requires capacity to understand proceedings; standard applied to waiver)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (constitutional right to self-representation; waiver must be knowing and intelligent)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (unreasonable application of federal law when state court applies governing principle to different facts)
Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680 (2009) (frames standard for determining contrariness or unreasonable application under §2254(d))
Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2006) (knowing and voluntary waiver considerations; credibility of defendant’s understanding)
Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2009) (ineffective assistance standard under Strickland; prejudice and deficiency)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel)
United States v. Johnson, 534 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (factors for determining knowing and voluntary waiver of rights)