Khatri v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia
Civil Action No. 2019-2644
| D.D.C. | Jun 11, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Daryao S. Khatri, a long‑time (tenured) physics professor, received an August 18, 2014 termination notice effective May 15, 2015, and thereafter taught as an adjunct with allegedly reduced assignments.
- From 1999–2014 Khatri challenged university hiring/appointment practices and filed multiple EEO complaints (notably a 1999 challenge to Dr. Anderson’s appointment; October 2014 EEO complaint alleging a pattern affecting foreign‑born and faculty of color; October 7, 2014 Faculty Senate resolution; November 2014 no‑confidence motion).
- After termination he alleged retaliation in hiring and teaching assignments (filed a November 2018 EEO complaint and later EEOC/D.C. OHR charges); the university investigated and found insufficient evidence.
- Khatri sued in D.C. Superior Court (July 31, 2019); defendant Board removed to federal court and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court applied liberal pro se pleading principles, evaluated whether specific actions were Title VII "protected activity," and whether a causal link to materially adverse actions (termination, failure to rehire, limited adjunct assignments) was plausibly pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Khatri engaged in Title VII protected activity | Khatri says his challenges and EEO filings opposed race/color/national‑origin discrimination (e.g., Anderson hire, Oct 2014 EEO, Faculty Senate resolution, no‑confidence motion). | Many challenges concerned internal procedures or age issues (not Title VII), and some EEO filings lack facts showing Title VII‑protected claims. | Court: Some activities plausibly protected (1999 Anderson challenge; Oct 2014 EEO to extent it alleged race/national origin; Oct 2014 Faculty Senate resolution; Nov 2014 no‑confidence motion). Baxter 2008 challenge and several EEO filings (2000, 2005, Jan 2015, Nov 2018) not sufficiently pleaded as Title VII protected. |
| Whether Khatri pleaded a causal link between protected activity and termination | Khatri contends termination and failure to rehire resulted from his protected opposition and complaints. | The October/November 2014 actions occurred after the August 2014 termination notice; temporal order defeats causation for those events. | Court: Dismissed claims that termination was retaliation for Oct/Nov 2014 activities (they post‑date the termination decision). But plaintiff plausibly alleged causation between the 1999 Anderson challenge and his termination at this stage. |
| Whether Khatri pleaded causation between protected activity and reduced adjunct assignments/failure to rehire | Khatri alleges reduced teaching load and not being rehired were retaliatory and pretextual (unequal assignments to adjuncts). | Defendant argues the long temporal gap (years/decades) defeats any inference of causation. | Court: At motion‑to‑dismiss stage, allegations suffice to plead causation for reduced adjunct assignments and failure to rehire given tenure context and asserted pretext. |
| Scope of dismissal/relief sought by defendant | Khatri seeks to proceed on multiple retaliation theories tied to various complaints and actions. | Defendant sought dismissal of the complaint (argued many claims not protected or lack causation). | Court: Granted in part and denied in part — dismissed claims based on Baxter 2008 challenge; EEO filings in 2000, 2005, Jan 2015, and Nov 2018; and dismissed the theory that termination was retaliation for Oct/Nov 2014 actions. Other retaliation theories (1999 Anderson challenge; Oct 2014 EEO re race/national origin; Faculty Senate resolution; Nov 2014 no‑confidence except as to termination; failure to rehire; reduced adjunct assignments; claims about termination of physics faculty) survive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (establishes plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (complaint must state plausible claim to survive dismissal)
- McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377 (opposition must be a practice the employee reasonably and in good faith believed unlawful under Title VII)
- Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889 (filing a formal complaint of discrimination is protected activity)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (retaliation claims require but‑for causation at later stages)
- Vance v. Chao, 496 F. Supp. 2d 182 (at motion‑to‑dismiss plaintiff may allege adverse actions were caused by protected activity)
- Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512 (knowledge plus temporal proximity can support an inference of causation)
- Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344 (temporal proximity supports causation only when events are very close in time; no bright‑line rule)
- Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65 (temporal proximity may suffice to raise inference of causation)
- Bloom v. McHugh, 828 F. Supp. 2d 43 (general or generic complaints that do not reference protected class do not constitute protected oppositional activity under Title VII)