Khambraya Stanley v. Scott Petroleum Corporation
184 So. 3d 940
| Miss. | 2016Background
- Khambraya Stanley and Jeanette Winchester were struck by an out-of-control car while standing at a gas-station walk-up window owned by Scott Petroleum; vending shelves were pushed into them.
- Plaintiffs sued Scott Petroleum for negligence, gross negligence, and respondeat superior, alleging the owner required patrons to stand in an unreasonably dangerous location and failed to provide barriers/curb around the walk-up window.
- Only written discovery had been completed; plaintiffs were preparing a property inspection, expert reports, and depositions when Scott Petroleum moved for summary judgment.
- Plaintiffs opposed summary judgment and alternatively requested a continuance under Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to complete discovery needed to contest foreseeability and duty.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Scott Petroleum (finding no duty to erect barriers); the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 56(f) continuance and remanding for further discovery and proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by denying a Rule 56(f) continuance before ruling on summary judgment | Stanley/Winchester: additional discovery (property inspection, expert reports, depositions) was essential to show foreseeability and duty | Scott Petroleum: no duty as a matter of law; discovery deadline had passed and plaintiff offered only generalized requests | Court reversed: plaintiffs showed specific reasons further discovery could produce facts disputing summary judgment; continuance should have been granted |
| Whether Scott Petroleum owed a duty to protect patrons from runaway vehicles at the walk-up window | Plaintiffs: placement of window without barriers created foreseeable risk; evidence of design choices and prior incidents needed | Scott Petroleum: owners generally not required to erect barriers to protect patrons from unforeseeable runaway vehicles | Court: duty is fact-specific and may depend on discovery; determination premature before additional evidence gathered |
| Appropriateness of granting summary judgment at the stage of limited discovery | Plaintiffs: premature and improvident without depositions/experts/property inspection | Defendant: summary judgment proper based on existing record | Court: summary judgment was premature given plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) showing |
| Standard for evaluating a Rule 56(f) request | Plaintiffs: invoked liberal application of Rule 56(f) and explained how further discovery would rebut movant’s showing | Defendant: argued plaintiffs failed to take required steps or show specific needed facts | Court: applied liberal Rule 56(f) standard; plaintiffs met burden of showing diligence and need for discovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Owens v. Thomae, 759 So.2d 1117 (Miss. 1999) (Rule 56(f) is to be applied liberally; denial reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Cheeks v. AutoZone, Inc., 154 So.3d 817 (Miss. 2014) (duty to protect from runaway vehicles is fact-specific; foreseeability determined after discovery)
- Prescott v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 740 So.2d 301 (Miss. 1999) (party resisting summary judgment must specify how postponement will enable rebuttal of movant’s showing)
- U.S. v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1983) (articulates need to show how postponement of ruling will permit discovery to rebut summary judgment showing)