Khalid Khowaja v. Jefferson Sessions III, 893 F.3d 1010

Khalid Khowaja, a Muslim, was hired as an FBI Special Agent on a two-year probationary term beginning February 2012 and was terminated July 5, 2013 for failing to meet FBI "suitability" standards (notably the "judgment" dimension).
Supervisors documented multiple judgment-related incidents (undisputed by Khowaja): interviewing an inmate without Miranda warnings, conducting an uncoordinated interview at West Bend High School, meeting a confidential human source in public, and bringing an untrained analyst into a dangerous area.
Performance evaluations (PSAs, a 6‑month NAA, and a PAR) repeatedly identified judgment as an area of deficiency; the NAA rated judgment "unacceptable" and proposed a plan of action.
Khowaja filed an EEOC complaint (and later this suit) alleging Title VII religious discrimination (hostile work environment voluntarily dismissed) and disparate treatment because he is Muslim, and retaliation for initiating EEOC proceedings (retaliation claim not appealed).
He pointed to SSA Mark Green’s questions about his religion, use of Arabic phrases and alleged mocking of accents, and to peer SA Adam Herndon as a comparator who was involved in some of the same incidents but was not fired.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Attorney General; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding Khowaja failed to show he met legitimate expectations and that Herndon was not a valid comparator demonstrating pretext.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Khowaja established a Title VII claim for religious discrimination/disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas	Khowaja contends he was terminated due to his religion and treated worse than non-Muslim peers (Herndon), showing disparate application of expectations and pretext	The FBI argues Khowaja was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: persistent, documented failures in the judgment suitability dimension	Court: Judgment for defendant. Khowaja failed to meet legitimate expectations and cannot show termination was due to religion; comparator evidence insufficient to show disparate treatment or pretext
Whether SA Adam Herndon was a "similarly situated" comparator demonstrating pretext	Khowaja: Herndon participated in some same incidents but was not terminated, showing disparate enforcement	DOJ: Herndon received counseling, did not defend his actions, had no prior law‑enforcement experience in the Miranda episode, and was not involved in other judgment incidents that led to Khowaja’s removal	Court: Not similarly situated. Key differences (lead investigator status, defensive conduct, additional incidents involving Khowaja) defeat comparator/pretext argument

Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (direct/indirect proof should be evaluated together; ask whether evidence permits reasonable factfinder to find discriminatory cause)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment proof)
McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cty., 866 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2017) (elements for prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas)
Elkhatib v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 493 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (disparate application of legitimate expectations can allow a plaintiff to survive summary judgment)
Brummett v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 284 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (employee who fails to meet legitimate expectations generally cannot make prima facie McDonnell Douglas case absent evidence that expectations are pretext)
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (comparison and selective enforcement evidence relevant to similarly situated and pretext analyses)