Khalid Ali Pasha v. State of Florida
225 So. 3d 688
| Fla. | 2017Background
- In 2002 Khalid Ali Pasha was observed at the Woodland Corporate Center (WCC) covered in blood; two victims (Robin Canady and Reneesha Singleton) were found dead nearby with stab and blunt-force injuries. Evidence (blood, weapons, clothing, footwear impressions) tied Pasha to the scene and victims.
- Police stopped Pasha after 911 calls from citizen-witnesses (the Sanchezes) who followed his white van and provided the license plate; deputies discovered bloody clothing and weapons in Pasha’s van after obtaining a warrant.
- Pasha represented himself at the 2013 retrial (after a prior 2007 conviction/sentence had been reversed for Faretta issues); he testified and admitted proximity to the victims but claimed a non-committal version of events rather than a firm alibi.
- A jury convicted Pasha of two counts of first-degree murder; the jury recommended death by an 11–1 vote. The trial court imposed two death sentences after weighing aggravators and mitigators.
- On direct appeal the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, rejected multiple guilt-phase claims (self-representation, suppression, evidentiary rulings, alibi instruction, prosecutorial comments, sufficiency), but vacated the death sentences and remanded for a new penalty phase under Hurst and related Florida precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pasha) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court’s offer of counsel coerced waiver of Faretta right / due process | Court’s offer (allowing standby counsel to re-litigate motions) improperly induced Pasha to waive self-representation and violated due process | Offer did not force counsel on Pasha; he voluntarily accepted, later reasserted Faretta and ultimately represented himself; no coercion or due process violation | Offer lawful; no Sixth Amendment or due process violation because waiver was voluntary and Pasha later represented himself |
| Speedy-trial / related continuances and motion to disqualify judge | Delay and court conduct (including alleged coercion) violated Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights and supported discharge / disqualification | Gaps were caused largely by defendant’s filings and requests; continuance was valid; no bad faith; successor judge properly ruled on disqualification | Barker balancing favors State; no speedy-trial violation; motion to disqualify properly denied (no clear record refuting successor judge) |
| Fourth Amendment—stop, detention, suppression | Deputies lacked reasonable suspicion from 911 dispatcher; Sanchezes were effectively anonymous so stop unlawful | Sanchezes were citizen-informants who followed van, gave plate, and flagged deputies; totality of circumstances gave reasonable suspicion for stop and detention | Stop and detention lawful; motion to suppress properly denied |
| Hurst / Ring challenge to death sentences (penalty-phase error) | Florida sentencing scheme violated Sixth Amendment—jury unanimity required for findings necessary to impose death; nonunanimous 11–1 recommendation renders death sentences invalid | State argued harmless or not applicable; but Hurst requires jury findings/unanimity for aggravators/sufficiency/weight/recommendation | Death sentences vacated; remand for new penalty phase under Hurst and Florida precedent (unanimous jury findings required) |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognition of the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (speedy-trial balancing test)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (death-penalty sentencing requires jury findings under Sixth Amendment)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. Supreme Court remedial holding requiring unanimous jury findings and recommendation)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (capital sentencing: jury must find aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause: testimonial hearsay requires prior cross-examination)
- Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (totality of circumstances and tip reliability for reasonable suspicion)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (official bad faith in speedy-trial context weighs heavily against government)