Khaled Sabbagh v. Hamilton Psychological Services Plc
941 NW2d 685
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2019Background
- Plaintiffs Sabbagh and Berry (former/retired Wayne County deputies) failed pre-employment psychological evaluations administered for Dearborn Police Department; reports authored by supervising psychologist Frendo raised concerns about plaintiffs’ health and emotional status.
- Evaluations were performed by limited-license psychologist Guertin (proctored multiple exams concurrently); Hamilton Psychological Services (Frendo’s practice) employed Guertin; Ulliance (HR vendor) selected Hamilton to provide evaluations for the city.
- Plaintiffs sued (filed 2016) alleging gross negligence (Count II) against Frendo, Guertin, Hamilton; negligence and vicarious liability against Hamilton (Count IV); negligence against Ulliance (Count V). Many emotional-distress claims were waived below.
- Trial court granted summary disposition for all defendants, concluding plaintiffs’ claims lacked legal/evidentiary support (court applied Dyer limited-duty analysis but found no professional relationship or common-law tort basis).
- On post-judgment motions, trial court denied case-evaluation sanctions to Frendo, Guertin, and Hamilton under the “interest of justice” exception, awarded limited costs to Ulliance but refused Ulliance’s attorney-fee request (found its billing summary inadmissible and declined to hold an evidentiary hearing).
- Court of Appeals: affirmed summary dismissals, held plaintiffs’ claims against Frendo and Guertin sounded in medical malpractice and were time-barred; affirmed dismissal of Hamilton and Ulliance claims on proximate-cause/duty grounds; reversed several rulings on sanctions procedure and remanded for reconsideration of sanctions to some defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do claims against Frendo/Guertin sound in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence? | Plaintiffs: evaluation conclusions are actionable (not malpractice) so malpractice SOL should not bar them. | Defendants: malpractice framework applies; claims raise medical-judgment issues requiring expert proof. | Held: Frendo and Guertin capable of malpractice; their evaluations constituted IME-like limited professional relationships; claims required expert proof and thus sounded in medical malpractice and were time-barred. |
| Is Dyer (limited-duty for IME physicians) limited to physicians or applied to psychologists? | Plaintiffs: Dyer applies only to physicians and IMEs, not psychological pre-employment exams. | Defendants: Dyer’s reasoning applies to any healthcare provider performing IME-functional evaluations. | Held: Dyer’s limited-relationship analysis extends to nonphysician healthcare providers performing IME-equivalent evaluations; trial court correctly applied Dyer. |
| Was Hamilton directly liable for plaintiffs’ lost employment/earning capacity (proximate cause)? | Plaintiffs: Harm extends beyond single DPD denial to diminished career opportunities generally because other agencies ask about failed psychological exams. | Hamilton: Even passing the psych exam only made applicants eligible for further steps; causation is speculative and not shown. | Held: Summary disposition for Hamilton proper: plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of proximate causation for loss of employment/earning capacity (speculation). |
| Did Ulliance owe plaintiffs a duty (negligence) as the HR vendor who selected Hamilton? | Plaintiffs: Ulliance had duty to exercise reasonable HR skill; foreseeable harm from negligent selection. | Ulliance: No contractual/relationship duty to plaintiffs; duty ran to Dearborn, not to applicants. | Held: Ulliance owed no duty to plaintiffs (no relationship); summary disposition affirmed. |
| Were case-evaluation sanctions and fee findings handled properly (billing admissibility, evidentiary hearing, recoverability of fees for pursuing sanctions, and interest-of-justice exception)? | Plaintiffs: invoked interest-of-justice to avoid sanctions; challenged defendants’ billing reasonableness and timing; opposed fee recovery for sanction-related work. | Defendants: entitled to actual costs/attorney fees after plaintiffs rejected case-evaluation awards; Ulliance contended its billing summary sufficed and fees for pursuing sanctions can be recoverable if causally connected. | Held: Court reversed in part: (1) Ulliance’s billing summary was admissible at pre-hearing stage and trial court erred in deeming it inadmissible; (2) trial court abused discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on fee reasonableness; (3) fees incurred pursuing case-evaluation sanctions can be recoverable if causally connected; (4) but trial court did not abuse discretion invoking interest-of-justice for Frendo/Guertin/Hamilton because the issue involved Michigan first impression (trial court must reconsider sanctions given some improper bases were relied upon). |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., 471 Mich 411 (recognizing who is capable of malpractice and that capability does not necessarily control label of the claim)
- Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich 45 (establishing limited professional relationship/duty for IME examiners and protections for opinions/conclusions)
- Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Gates Performance Eng’g, Inc., 285 Mich App 362 (standard for reviewing summary disposition under MCR 2.116)
- Smith v. Kouri, 481 Mich 519 (requirement that fee applicants submit detailed billing records and court review for reasonableness)
- Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. v. Boyce Trust 2350, 497 Mich 265 (clarifying recovery of postjudgment fees and causal nexus for case-evaluation sanctions)