Khadidja Issa v. Lancaster School District
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1595
3rd Cir.2017Background
- Six refugee youths (ages 18–21), classified as SLIFE (students with limited or interrupted formal education), arrived in Lancaster, PA and were placed by the School District in Phoenix Academy, an accelerated, credit-recovery school, rather than McCaskey High School’s International School, which provides sheltered instruction and intensive ESL.
- Phoenix’s model: accelerated pace (five 80-minute classes/day, half-year courses), one 80-minute ESL class/day, commingled ELLs with native speakers, strict security/behavior-focused grading; International School: two daily ESL classes, sheltered content courses, slower pacing.
- Plaintiffs alleged they could not meaningfully understand content classes at Phoenix; some were delayed or hindered in enrollment; one student graduated from Phoenix despite limited English proficiency.
- Plaintiffs sued under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) §1703(f), Title VI, Fourteenth Amendment claims, and Pennsylvania school statutes; the District Court granted a preliminary injunction ordering enrollment at McCaskey/International School and other remedial measures.
- The Third Circuit reviewed the injunction on interlocutory appeal; it affirmed the injunction based on EEOA violations but remanded state-law issues for the district court to consider threshold questions (e.g., existence of implied private causes of action).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on EEOA §1703(f) claim (failure to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers) | Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered program is unsound for SLIFE and fails to produce results; District lacks disaggregated data showing Phoenix overcomes language barriers | School Dist. contended Phoenix’s structured-immersion/ESL approach is sound and points to graduations and some student success as evidence of effectiveness | Court: Likely success — applied Castaneda test and found failure on prongs 1 (unsound theory for SLIFE) and 3 (no evidence Phoenix produces results); §1703(f) does not require proof of discriminatory intent; nexus to national origin satisfied |
| Interpretation of “on account of” in §1703 preamble — does it require intent to discriminate? | Plaintiffs: §1703(f) forbids failing to take appropriate action irrespective of discriminatory intent; remedy targets lost educational opportunity tied to protected characteristic | School Dist.: “On account of” requires proof that placement or failure was motivated by national origin (intent) | Court: Rejected intent requirement; Congress omitted “discrimination” in (f) intentionally; §1703(f) creates cause of action for failure to overcome language barriers without proving discriminatory motive; requires nexus between lost opportunity and protected characteristic |
| Appropriateness of preliminary injunction (irreparable harm, balance, public interest) | Loss of limited school-term eligibility and time-sensitive language acquisition cause likely irreparable harm; public interest favors compliance with EEOA | School Dist.: Injunction usurps local placement authority and may cause administrative/budgetary disruption | Court: Irreparable harm likely; balance of harms and public interest favor plaintiffs; injunction within district court’s discretion (but district court should allow School Dist. to propose remedies before any permanent relief) |
| Validity / cognizability of plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania state-law claims | Plaintiffs relied on state statutes/regulations requiring timely enrollment and eligibility to age 21 to support injunction | School Dist.: State-law remedies do not expressly provide private equitable cause of action; may require administrative exhaustion | Court: Remanded — district court erred in assuming private cause of action without analysis; left threshold questions about implied private remedies and exhaustion to district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (schools cannot ignore need for language assistance; same treatment without language instruction can deny meaningful education)
- Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (three-part test for §1703(f): sound educational theory; implementation reasonably calculated to work; results showing barriers are overcome)
- Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (Supreme Court discussed §1703(f) and reliance on Castaneda; courts must tailor remedies essential to correct denials)
- Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (interpretation of statutory causes of action and private enforcement limits)
- Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Castaneda framework to assess adequacy of language programs)
- Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., 618 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Title VI analysis from EEOA; EEOA claim may proceed without Title VI findings)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (immigrant children have Fourteenth Amendment right to public education)