Keyes v. Sessions
282 F. Supp. 3d 858
M.D. Penn.2017Background
- Plaintiff Michael Keyes is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(4), which prohibits firearm possession by persons previously involuntarily committed for mental illness; he brought an as-applied Second Amendment challenge.
- The court engaged the Marzzarella two-step framework but had to decide the proper analysis at step two (means-end scrutiny) and whether as-applied challenges to § 924(g)(4) are permissible.
- The opinion contrasts two Third Circuit approaches in Binderup: Judge Ambro’s requirement that the government present evidence tied to challengers’ specific characteristics, and Judge Fuentes’ more general reliance on legislative/statistical evidence linking past conduct to future risk.
- Defendants acknowledged the important government interest in public safety but offered general evidence that prior involuntary commitment correlates with future risk, and argued administration concerns counseled against as-applied relief.
- The court found Keyes had distinguished himself from the broader disqualified class (e.g., his commitment was over a decade ago, no subsequent problems, regular professional firearm use) and held the government’s generalized evidence insufficient under intermediate scrutiny as applied to Keyes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper means-end scrutiny at Marzzarella step two | Intermediate scrutiny; government must show fit specific to Keyes | Intermediate scrutiny satisfied by general studies linking past commitment to future risk (Fuentes approach) | Court applies intermediate scrutiny but requires evidence tied to Keyes’ circumstances (follows Ambro) |
| Availability of as-applied challenges to § 924(g)(4) | As-applied challenges are permissible and meaningful for those who distinguish themselves from the barred class | As-applied challenges are error-prone and should be foreclosed due to public-safety stakes (Fuentes) | As-applied challenges to § 924(g)(4) are permissible; Fuentes’ categorical bar rejected |
| Burden and specificity of government proof | Government must present evidence explaining why banning people like Keyes promotes safety | General statistical/legislative evidence suffices to show reasonable fit | Government must present evidence reasonably linking the statute’s means to risk posed by the challenger’s specific background |
| Application to Keyes | Keyes’ individualized facts show he is not within the historically excluded class; statute’s enforcement against him violates the Second Amendment | Defendants argue Keyes remains at heightened relapse risk and general evidence supports disarmament | Summary judgment for Keyes: § 924(g)(4) fails intermediate scrutiny as applied; enforcement violates his Second Amendment right |
Key Cases Cited
- Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (interpreting Marzzarella and presenting divergent Third Circuit views on specificity required under intermediate scrutiny)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (two-step Second Amendment framework referenced for means-end analysis)
- United Public Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (as-applied First Amendment challenge rejected; relied upon by Fuentes but distinguished by this court)