34 Cal.App.5th 505
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Sarah Plott Key and sisters Elizabeth Plott Tyler (trustee/beneficiary) and Jennifer Plott Potz are beneficiaries of a family trust; Tyler procured a 2007 amendment that substantially advantaged her and reduced Key’s share.
- Key petitioned in probate (2011) to invalidate the 2007 Amendment for undue influence; the probate court granted the petition and this court affirmed in Key v. Tyler I.
- After remand Key filed a No Contest Petition seeking forfeiture under the Trust’s no-contest clause and reimbursement of attorney fees for defending Tyler’s appeal.
- Tyler moved to strike Key’s No Contest Petition under the anti-SLAPP statute and opposed the fee request. The probate court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and denied fees.
- On appeal this court reversed: it held the anti-SLAPP statute applies to no-contest enforcement actions but Key met the second-step showing of probable success because Tyler’s judicial defense of the 2007 Amendment constituted a direct contest brought without probable cause; the Trust’s fee clause authorizes reimbursement of Key’s appellate fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Key) | Defendant's Argument (Tyler) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to petitions to enforce probate no-contest clauses | Anti-SLAPP should not apply because it adds litigation and conflicts with Probate Code policy and §1000 rules | Anti-SLAPP applies because enforcement arises from pleadings/statements in judicial proceedings (protected petitioning) | Anti-SLAPP applies; statute’s plain language covers petitioning conduct in probate (court follows Urick) |
| Whether Tyler’s defense of the 2007 Amendment constituted a "direct contest" under Probate Code §§21310–21311 | Tyler’s judicial defense sought to impair/invalidat e original trust terms and thus is a direct contest; prior undue-influence findings support lack of probable cause | Defense was responsive to Key’s petition or made in trustee capacity and thus not a beneficiary-initiated direct contest; litigation privilege applies | Tyler’s defense was a direct contest (effect, not label, controls); pleadings and conduct show she acted as beneficiary; litigation privilege does not bar enforcement because Probate statutes are specific |
| Who bears burden to prove probable cause under §21311 | Key argued Tyler lacked probable cause; court should allocate burden to party asserting protection | Tyler argued probable-cause is plaintiff’s burden or that Key failed to prove lack of probable cause | Court concludes Key (seeking enforcement/forfeiture) bears burden to prove lack of probable cause; Key met prima facie showing via prior findings |
| Whether Trust’s Article 14 permits Key to recover attorney fees for defending Tyler’s appeal | Article 14’s payment-for-"expenses to resist any contest" covers beneficiary litigation expenses and supports fee award | Tyler argued Trust/contract principles do not obligate paying Key’s fees or motion was untimely | Article 14 authorizes payment of Key’s fees from the trust as administration expenses; remand to determine reasonable amount and whether charged against Tyler’s share |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (describing two-step anti-SLAPP analysis and plaintiff’s burden at step two)
- Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. La Marche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (anti-SLAPP applies to claims arising from prior litigation like malicious prosecution)
- Donkin v. Donkin, 58 Cal.4th 412 (overview of no-contest clause policy and statutory evolution)
- Urick v. Urick, 15 Cal.App.5th 1182 (held anti-SLAPP applies to no-contest enforcement actions)
- Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205 (litigation privilege purpose and limits)
- Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335 (issue preclusion requires issue actually litigated and necessarily decided)