Key v. Rapelje, 634 F. App'x 141

Background

Alvin Key was convicted by a Michigan jury of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on his daughter’s testimony that he sexually abused her over several years; sentence: concurrent 15–40 years as a habitual offender.
At trial the prosecution introduced evidence concerning uncharged acts involving two other girls (A.K. and Y.K.) after the trial court allowed such evidence for limited purposes; the defense objected.
Some witnesses corroborated the complainant; others (including A.K. and Y.K.) gave inconsistent testimony and some recanted prior allegations.
Key argued on direct appeal and in state postconviction proceedings that the admission and use of the other-acts evidence and various prosecutorial statements and tactics amounted to prosecutorial misconduct violating due process.
Michigan courts rejected these claims; Key filed a federal habeas petition raising the same issues. The district court denied relief but granted a COA limited to the prosecutorial-misconduct claim.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference and evaluating whether the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent (principally Darden v. Wainwright).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Key)	Defendant's Argument (State/Prosecutor)	Held
Admissibility/use of other-acts evidence and prosecutor’s reliance on it	Admission and use of evidence about A.K. and Y.K. prejudiced jury and was improper propensity evidence	Evidence was admissible under Michigan rules for bearing on delay/credibility; prosecutor properly relied on trial-court rulings	Court held this is largely a state evidentiary ruling; prosecutor did not commit misconduct by relying on judge’s admission; no federal due-process violation
Elicitation of hearsay / testimonial-form questions / improper witness interrogation	Prosecutor elicited hearsay, refreshed recollection improperly, and asked testimonial questions that vouched for facts	Trial judge sanctioned the prosecutor’s methods or cured issues; objections were sustained and curative instructions given	Court found these were evidentiary issues under state law, cured by rulings/instructions, and not unreasonable constitutional error
Improper remarks in closing argument (seven comments: labeling witnesses liars, octopus/smokescreen, comments about defense counsel, implying withheld evidence, misstatement of criminal history)	Closing comments were inflammatory, vouched for credibility, attacked defense counsel, misstated evidence, and prejudiced the jury	Comments were record-based argument, responsive to defense, isolated, and promptly cured by objections and jury instructions	Court held comments did not infect trial with unfairness under Darden; curative instructions and context cured any harm; no habeas relief warranted
AEDPA deference / claim should be reviewed de novo	State postconviction decision did not address federal due-process claim, so federal court should review de novo	The Michigan Court of Appeals rendered a reasoned decision on direct review; later summary denials adopt that reasoning, so AEDPA deference applies	Court applied AEDPA deference and found the state-court decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent

Key Cases Cited

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (governing due-process standard for prosecutorial misconduct: whether comments infected trial with unfairness)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (explaining AEDPA "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" standards)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA relief requires state-court decision to be unreasonable beyond fairminded disagreement)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas not a vehicle to reexamine state-law evidentiary rulings)
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (limits on prosecutor injecting personal beliefs; standards for improper argument)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838 (2009) (jurors presumed to follow curative instructions)