Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Will Hegar and Loree Hegar
403 S.W.3d 318
Tex. App.2013Background
- Key Operating pooled its Curbo and Richardson mineral interests to form a 40-acre Richardson-Curbo pool; the pool is used to produc e oil via wells on the Richardson tract, access to which is via a road across the Curbo tract.
- Will and Loree Hegar purchased the surface estate and a one-fourth mineral interest in the Curbo tract in 2002, aware Key Operating used the Curbo road to service wells on the Richardson tract.
- Key Operating has used the Curbo road since 1994; after pooling in 2000, production from the pool involves oil that may be commingled from multiple tracts.
- In 2007 the He-gars sued for trespass and sought an injunction against use of the road; the trial court issued a permanent injunction barring use of the Hegars’ surface for any activity related to minerals from an adjoining tract.
- The issue centers on whether Key Operating has an implied surface easement to use the road across Curbo to produce from the pooled unit, and whether production from Curbo can be used to justify roadway access; the trial court found Key Operating did not have authority to use the Curbo surface if it was not producing from Curbo, and the court affirmed an injunction against use for production solely from Richardson.
- The court ultimately held that Key Operating has an implied easement to use the Curbo surface to produce from the Curbo tract as part of the pooled unit, subject to accommodation for the surface owner; however, absent pooling consent or a right to produce from Curbo, Key Operating cannot use the road for production exclusively from Richardson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pooling post-severance expands Key Operating’s surface rights over Hegars’ land | Hegars: pooling/lease post-severance cannot bind them or enlarge surface rights | Key Operating: pooling rights extend to surface use for pooled production | Pooling cannot bind Hegars; but surface rights exist to the Curbo tract’s minerals and may be used with accommodation |
| Whether Key Operating has an implied easement to use the Curbo road to produce from the Curbo-Richardson pool | Hegars: implied easement does not allow pooling to burden surface | Key Operating: implied easement permits use to produce from pooled unit, subject to accommodation | Yes, Key Operating has an implied easement to use the road to produce from the Curbo tract as part of the pool, subject to accommodation |
| Whether the evidence supports that production is from Curbo tract to justify the easement | Key Operating taxed the road based on Curbo production | He-gars: wells on Richardson tract produce oil not from Curbo | Evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the wells producing via the Richardson tract were not proving Curbo production, thus limiting the easement accordingly |
| Whether the accommodation doctrine applies to balance Key Operating’s use with Hegars’ rights | Hegars rely on accommodation doctrine to limit road use | Key Operating argues there is no impairment of existing use that requires accommodation | Accommodation doctrine applies; Key Operating must use surface reasonably and accommodate Hegars’ use; but road use for Curbo-related production may be allowed |
| Whether Key Operating’s rights extend to production from pooled tracts when not consented by surface owner | Hegars: no rights beyond pre-severance terms without consent | Key Operating: implied easement persists for pooled unit production | Right to pool does not bind against surface owner’s consent; rights hinge on the implied easement and accommodation |
Key Cases Cited
- Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971) (accommodation doctrine; implied surface easement balancing surface and mineral rights)
- Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1973) (surface owner cannot burden for off-lease production; accommodation)
- Miller v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 309 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958) (pooled production across tracts permissible; surface burden only if reasonable)
- Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (implied surface rights; production rights attached to mineral estate)
- Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993) (accommodation/alternative means doctrine; reasonable use balancing)
- Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 860 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993) (rights of surface owner can be affected by mineral operations; access considerations)
- Roberts v. Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982) (concepts of implied surface easement and severance)
