143 A.3d 751
D.C.2016Background
- Police found two partially filled half‑ounce vials of liquid later tested as 5.6 grams of liquid PCP in the driver‑side door of Kevin Young’s running SUV; Young admitted ownership and placed his hand over the vials when officers opened the door.
- Kevin Young was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute (PWID) and possession of liquid PCP.
- Young’s nephew Maurice initially testified at a suppression hearing that Kevin was driving; before trial Maurice’s counsel proffered Maurice would testify he was the last driver and unfamiliar with the drugs.
- OAG granted Maurice immunity for DUI and no‑permit charges but denied immunity for drug possession and underage drinking; Maurice invoked the Fifth at trial on whether he was the driver and largely declined to admit placing drugs in the car.
- Trial court ruled Carter did not apply because the proffered testimony was not “clearly exculpatory”; jury convicted Young of PWID and possession of liquid PCP.
- On appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals held the proffer was exculpatory but not material under Carter/Brady, affirmed PWID conviction (sufficient evidence of intent to distribute), and remanded to merge the liquid‑PCP possession conviction into PWID.
Issues
| Issue | Young’s Argument | Government/OAG Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proffered testimony triggered Carter (defense‑witness immunity) — i.e., must be exculpatory/"clearly exculpatory" | Maurice’s proffer that he was the last driver is exculpatory because it increases reasonable doubt that Kevin had dominion and control over the drugs | OAG argued testimony wasn’t exculpatory or that it would be clearly perjurious, so immunity denial was reasonable | Court: Proffered testimony is exculpatory (does not need to wholly exculpate); Carter uses Brady’s meaning of exculpatory. |
| Whether OAG’s refusal to immunize Maurice was reasonable under Carter (materiality and perjury concerns) | Denial prevented jurors hearing potentially exculpatory testimony and distorted fact‑finding; Maurice’s testimony could create reasonable doubt | OAG claimed clear indications Maurice would perjure himself justified denial of immunity | Court: No clear perjury; but proffered testimony was not material (no reasonable probability of different outcome), so Carter not implicated; decline to affirm on perjury ground. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for intent to distribute (PWID) | Young argued amount was small and consistent with personal use | Government presented packaging, expert testimony that half‑ounce vials are distribution packaging and usually sold to dealers, and conduct (covering vials, ownership of car) | Court: Evidence sufficient—packaging and circumstances supported an inference of intent to distribute. |
| Whether PWID and possession of liquid PCP convictions must merge under Double Jeopardy | Young argued possession is lesser‑included offense and should merge | Government did not oppose merger | Court: Affirmed PWID, remanded to vacate liquid‑PCP possession conviction; legislative history shows liquid‑PCP statute is an enhanced possession penalty, not intended to create separate punishments. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996) (establishes four‑part test for defense‑witness immunity and ties it to Brady materiality)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose evidence favorable and material to defendant)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (defines Brady materiality standard)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (Brady/Agurs discussion of favorable evidence and materiality)
- United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992) (source of Carter’s four‑part test language)
- Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)