Kevin Stanbridge v. Gregory Scott
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11041
7th Cir.2015Background
- Kevin Stanbridge was convicted in 2005 of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, sentenced to 7 years (with credit) and 2 years mandatory supervised release, and completed that sentence in May 2007.
- While his criminal appeal and supervised release were pending, Illinois initiated civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act; probable-cause detention began May 2005 and he remained in IDHS custody after his sentence expired.
- In October 2007 a jury found Stanbridge to be a sexually violent person; he was committed for treatment and remains confined under that civil commitment.
- In February 2012 Stanbridge filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition attacking his 2005 criminal conviction (claim now focused on prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument).
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding Stanbridge was not "in custody pursuant to" the criminal judgment when he filed the petition because his sentence had expired and he was confined under a civil commitment.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding civil commitment is a collateral (not direct) consequence of the criminal conviction and thus does not render Stanbridge "in custody" for habeas review of that expired conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petitioner is "in custody pursuant to" the 2005 criminal conviction for §2254 jurisdiction | Stanbridge: civil commitment is a significant restraint and a necessary predicate of his confinement, so he remains "in custody" under the criminal conviction | Respondent: sentence expired; civil commitment is a collateral consequence and does not satisfy the §2254 custody requirement | Court: Not in custody under the criminal conviction; civil commitment is collateral and thus insufficient for §2254 jurisdiction |
| Whether collateral consequences that substantially restrict liberty can qualify as "in custody" absent being part of the criminal judgment | Stanbridge: substantial physical restraint should suffice regardless of directness | Respondent: custody must be direct consequence of the challenged conviction | Court: To be "in custody" for §2254 a restraint must be both non-negligible and a direct consequence of the conviction; collateral consequences, even severe ones, do not qualify |
| Whether the federal court may entertain an attack on the prior conviction when custody is based on a later civil commitment that used the prior conviction as predicate | Stanbridge: asked not to recharacterize petition as attacking civil commitment (strategic) | Respondent: if petition were construed as attacking civil custody, court might be limited by preclusion rules (Coss) | Court: Even if recharacterized, Lackawanna Cnty. v. Coss generally bars challenging an earlier conviction used to support later confinement except narrow exceptions (not applicable here) |
| Appropriate procedural vehicle to attack an expired conviction causing collateral consequences | Stanbridge: sought habeas under §2254 | Respondent: habeas unavailable as to expired sentence; other remedies limited | Court: §2254 unavailable; coram nobis exists but is narrow and not invoked here; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (custody requirement jurisdictional; expired sentence does not leave petitioner "in custody" for that conviction)
- Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) (prior convictions no longer open to direct or collateral attack generally cannot be challenged when later used to enhance or predicate new confinement)
- Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing collateral consequences and physical liberty threshold for custody)
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole as direct consequence that can satisfy "in custody")
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (distinguishing direct and collateral consequences in criminal-consequence contexts)
- Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 1997) (community-service order can qualify as "in custody" when it significantly restrains liberty)
- Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2014) (federal jurisdiction exists to review civil commitment under Illinois sexually dangerous/persons statutes)