Kevin R. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 4th 676

Background

Kevin R. is a registered sex offender and the father of A.R., with parole restrictions prohibiting contact with children including his daughter.
San Diego HHSA/district court dependency petition filed for A.R. in 2009; Kevin’s visitation was initially liberal and supervised with parole concurrence.
Parole modified in March 2010 to allow weekly supervised visits at CWS; social worker noted this could be suspended if not properly supervised.
In April 2010 the court questioned visits at CWS due to no-contact parole restrictions; May–June 2010 visitation was suspended for about two months due to a court misinterpretation, later reinstated July 9, 2010.
Six-month review held August 16, 2010; court found Kevin made some progress but not substantial, and that a no-contact parole condition limited reunification; hearing proceeded with Kevin not present.
Twelve-month review date was October 19, 2010; court found no substantial probability of return and terminated reunification services, setting a section 366.26 hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the juvenile court improperly delegate visitation authority to the parole officer?	Kevin: court delegated visitation to parole, violating due process.	Agency: no improper delegation; visitation ordered with parole concurrence and kept within statutory limits.	No reversible error; no improper delegation; visitation remained within court authority and parole constraints.
Was there substantial evidence that no reasonable probability of return by the 12-month date existed, given parole constraints?	Kevin: evidence shows potential for return if parole modified; social worker’s comments speculative.	Court: substantial evidence supported no probability of return given parenting deficits, housing, and continuing parole restrictions.	Substantial evidence supported no substantial probability of return by 12-month date.
Were reunification services reasonable even with parole constraints and the May–June 2010 suspension?	Kevin: services were not reasonable because parole barrier and suspension impeded reunification.	Kevin received services appropriate to his case plan; any suspension was an error but overall services were reasonable under circumstances.	There was substantial evidence services were reasonable under the circumstances.
Did terminating reunification solely on the parole condition violate Kevin's due process?	Kevin: parole condition unrelated to offense cannot justify termination of reunification.	Court: parole status and conditions can be considered in best interests; termination not solely based on parole condition.	Not a due process violation; parole status properly considered in context.

Key Cases Cited

In re Prather, 50 Cal.4th 238 (2010) (parole board controls parole conditions; court may modify conditions)
In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal.2d 295 (1967) (parole conditions and court authority to modify limits)
In re E.J., 47 Cal.4th 1258 (2009) (parole conditions related to safety and proper scope of restrictions)
In re Hudson, 143 Cal.App.4th 1 (2006) (parole as correctional authority; constructive imprisonment concept)
In re Roberts, 36 Cal.4th 575 (2005) (courts defer to parole authority; due process considerations for parolees)
In re Dakota H., 132 Cal.App.4th 212 (2005) (forfeiture/waiver of issues in juvenile dependency appeals)
In re James R., 153 Cal.App.4th 413 (2007) (limits on delegation of visitation authority to social services)
In re Misako R., 2 Cal.App.4th 538 (1991) (reasonableness standard for reunification services; safety emphasis)
In re Riva M., 235 Cal.App.3d 403 (1991) (agency obligation to identify problems and provide services; reasonable efforts)
Robin V. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.4th 1158 (1995) (visitation as a core component; reasonableness of agency efforts)
People v. Villa, 45 Cal.4th 1063 (2009) (parole condition modification procedures and habeas corpus path)