Kevin Q. v. Lauren W.
195 Cal. App. 4th 633
Cal. Ct. App.2011Background
- This paternity action under the Uniform Parentage Act began in March 2007 with Kevin Q. seeking to be declared Lauren W.'s child's father; a paternity judgment in Kevin's favor was reversed on appeal.
- Lauren sought attorney fees incurred in two consolidated cases, requesting a total of $227,746, including stage one and stage two fees, plus previously unpaid amounts.
- The trial court denied Lauren's fee request after considering the parties' incomes, needs, and the case's financial complexity, including Lauren's lack of income and reliance on gifts.
- The court relied on sections 7605 and 7640 (UPA) and, to some extent, section 2032 (a dissolution-fee provision) to determine whether fees should be awarded and in what amount.
- The record showed Kevin's income and Lauren's lack thereof, along with substantial combined attorney fees for both sides; the court found both parties had limited ability to pay and considered gifts to Lauren as income for purposes of ability to pay.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly applied the applicable statutes and standards in denying fee awards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether UPA fee statutes 7605/7640 or dissolution statute 2032 apply | Lauren argues 7605/7640 govern UPA fees and 2032 is inapplicable. | Kevin argues the court appropriately used 2032 guidance to evaluate ability to pay under 7605/7640. | Court properly considered 2032 guidance in context of UPA. |
| Whether regular gifts to Lauren from her father should be treated as income for ability to pay | Lauren contends gifts are not income and should not affect ability to pay. | Kevin contends the court should treat recurring gifts as income when calculating ability to pay. | Court did not abuse: gifts were substantial, regular, and thus properly considered in ability to pay. |
| Whether the court abused its discretion in denying any attorney-fee award to Lauren | Lauren asserts fees were reasonably necessary and amount appropriate. | Kevin contends fees were excessive and not reasonably necessary; the case involved disproportionate billing. | Court's denial of Lauren's fee request was not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Robert J. v. Catherine D., 134 Cal.App.4th 1392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (7640 not aligned with 2030; informs interpretation of 7640)
- Banning v. Newdow, 119 Cal.App.4th 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (addressed res judicata and fee awards under family law)
- Alicia R. v. Timothy M., 29 Cal.App.4th 1232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (abuse of discretion standard for fee awards; need-based analysis)
- City and County of San Francisco v. Ragland, 188 Cal.App.3d 1375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (7640 predecessor; discretion in fee awards)
- In re Marriage of Dietz, 176 Cal.App.4th 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (standard for apportioning costs under dissolution cases; sources cited for 2032 guidance)
- In re Marriage of Alter, 171 Cal.App.4th 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (recurring gifts may be considered income for child-support purposes)
- In re Marriage of Schulze, 60 Cal.App.4th 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (gifts to an adult child; support inference; income consideration)
- In re Marriage of Bardzik, 165 Cal.App.4th 1291 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (imputation of income and support considerations in fee context)