684 F. App'x 947
11th Cir.2017Background
- Prescott defaulted on his mortgage; servicer Seterus prepared foreclosure and Prescott sought loan reinstatement under the security instrument.
- Seterus sent a reinstatement payoff that included $1,125 in incurred attorney’s fees and $3,175 in estimated attorney’s fees; Prescott paid and later received a refund of the estimated fees.
- Prescott sued under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (Florida Act), arguing the mortgage authorized only actual (incurred) fees, not estimated fees.
- On initial appeal this Court reversed summary judgment for Seterus on the federal claim, concluding the mortgage’s past‑tense language did not clearly authorize estimated fees; remanded the Florida Act claim for consideration of Seterus’ actual knowledge.
- On remand the district court entered summary judgment for Prescott on the federal claim and for Seterus on the Florida Act claim; Prescott appealed the adverse Florida Act ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Seterus had the actual knowledge required to violate the Florida Act by attempting to collect estimated fees | Seterus knew the mortgage did not authorize estimated fees; that knowledge makes collection unlawful under the Florida Act | Seterus lacked actual knowledge; plaintiff waived responses and lacks standing because refunded fees negate injury | Reversed: genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Seterus’ actual knowledge; summary judgment for Seterus on Florida Act was erroneous |
| Whether a plaintiff must show the defendant knew Florida Act prohibited the conduct | Not required; liability can rest on actual knowledge that no instrument authorized the debt | Seterus suggested a different standard requiring knowledge of the statute | Court: actual knowledge that the debt/instrument did not authorize the charge suffices; need not show defendant knew statutory prohibition |
| Whether procedural defaults (failure to reply to summary judgment and to local rule statement) waive Prescott’s arguments | Prescott’s own summary judgment filing and the district court’s refusal to deem facts admitted cure any waiver | Seterus argued procedural defaults waived opposition | Court: no waiver; district court did not rely on Local Rule 56.1 so those arguments fail |
| Whether refunding the estimated fees eliminates Prescott’s standing | Prescott was deprived of use of money for a time, creating cognizable injury | Seterus argued refund removes injury in fact | Court: refund does not destroy standing; temporary deprivation is an injury in fact |
Key Cases Cited
- Dolphin LLC v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 715 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2013) (standard of review and burden on summary judgment movant)
- Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (view facts and inferences in light most favorable to nonmovant)
- Prescott v. Seterus, Inc., 635 F. App’x 640 (11th Cir. 2015) (prior panel decision on federal claim and remand instructions on Florida Act knowledge issue)
- Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2010) (appellate review will not rely on district court local‑rule rulings where district court declined to do so)
- Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2004) (temporary deprivation of money can be a cognizable injury in fact)
- Read v. MFP, Inc., 85 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (example that a debt collector may violate the Florida Act by attempting to collect a debt that has been satisfied)