Kevin M. Clark v. State of Indiana, 2013 Ind. LEXIS 700

Background

At ~12:13 a.m., police accompanied a storage-facility owner who suspected a renter was living in a unit; officers encountered Collins, Eller, and Clark outside the unit; Clark dropped a black bag.
Officers ordered the three to sit on the ground, questioned Clark about the bag, and Clark admitted there was marijuana inside.
Sergeant McHenry opened and searched the bag, finding marijuana and items suggesting meth manufacture; officers then located Clark’s car, smelled burnt marijuana, opened the trunk (using Clark’s keys), smelled ammonia, found a toolbox with suspected meth lab equipment, and later used a K9 to alert to the car.
Clark was not Mirandized until transported to jail; he refused later consent to search the car.
Clark was tried and convicted for attempted dealing in methamphetamine (class A felony); he appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying suppression of his statements and the evidence obtained after the seizure.
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed: it held the initial encounter was a nonconsensual detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion, so Clark’s statement and all evidence derived from that seizure were fruits of an unlawful stop and should have been suppressed.

Issues

Issue	Clark's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the officers’ initial encounter was a consensual encounter, a Terry stop, or an arrest	The encounter became a Fourth Amendment seizure when officers ordered the men to sit on the ground; no reasonable suspicion justified the detention	The officers’ approach was consensual or, alternatively, the detention was justified by reasonable suspicion from the owner’s report	The encounter was a nonconsensual seizure requiring Fourth Amendment protection and was not supported by reasonable suspicion
Whether Clark’s admission (that the bag contained marijuana) and the subsequent search of the black bag were admissible	Admission and bag search were fruits of the unlawful detention and therefore inadmissible; Miranda warnings came too late	The admission provided probable cause to search the bag and justified its search	Clark’s admission and the bag search were tainted by the unlawful stop and should have been suppressed
Whether the evidence seized from Clark’s vehicle (including meth materials) was admissible despite the unlawful stop	Vehicle evidence was derivative of the illegal detention/search and not sufficiently attenuated; no independent or inevitable-source justification	The vehicle search was justified by (1) smell of burnt marijuana, (2) exigent concerns about an active meth lab, (3) later K9 alert and warrant	Vehicle evidence was also fruit of the poisonous tree: temporal proximity, lack of intervening circumstances, and no independent/inevitable-source proof — should have been suppressed
Whether Miranda warnings or other factors purged the taint of the illegal stop	Miranda was given only later and did not purge the taint; other factors (time, intervening events, purposefulness) weigh against attenuation	State suggested Miranda or passage of time could attenuate the taint	Miranda alone (and the facts here) did not attenuate the causal chain; suppression required

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation standards)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1963) (verbal statements and tangible evidence that flow directly from illegal police action are fruits of the poisonous tree)
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (U.S. 1975) (Miranda warnings do not automatically purge the taint of an illegal arrest; attenuation is case-specific)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (brief investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts)
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (U.S. 1984) (inevitable discovery and independent source exceptions to exclusionary rule)
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (U.S. 2005) (use of a properly deployed drug-detection dog during a lawful traffic stop is not a Fourth Amendment search)