Kevin Lipman v. Armond Budish, 974 F.3d 726

Background

Ta’Naejah McCloud (born 2011) suffered repeated severe abuse by her mother Tequila Crump and Crump’s partner Ursula Owens; injuries included third-degree burns, fractures, malnutrition, and ultimately fatal blunt-force trauma in March 2017.
Cuyahoga County/DCFS caseworkers received multiple reports, interviewed Ta’Naejah several times, and on multiple occasions interviewed her in the presence of Crump and Owens despite policies favoring separate interviews; DCFS returned her to her mother after hospitalization and after some examinations.
Plaintiffs (estate representative and legal custodian) sued county officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (substantive and procedural due process) and asserted state-law claims and a Monell claim against the county; they later sought to amend based on deposition testimony.
The district court dismissed all federal claims (holding DeShaney bars relief except in custody or state-created danger situations, and finding neither exception met), declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, and struck Plaintiffs’ Rule 59 motion for violating a stipulated protective order.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit: held the appeal timely; affirmed dismissal of custody- and procedural-based due process claims; reversed dismissal as to a state-created-danger substantive due process claim based on allegations that interviews in the abusers’ presence were affirmative acts increasing risk; found Monell allegations plausibly pleaded at the motion-to-dismiss stage; vacated the order striking the Rule 59 filings and ordered them unsealed; denied defendants’ motion to seal the appellate brief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DeShaney custody exception applies	Ta’Naejah was in state custody during hospitalization and/or co-custody when taken to appointments, so state had duty	No; injuries occurred after return to mother, and custody exception applies only to harms occurring in custody	Rejected Plaintiffs’ custody theory — custody exception not satisfied
Whether state-created-danger doctrine supports substantive due process claim	Repeated interviews of Ta’Naejah in front of alleged abusers were affirmative acts that increased risk of private violence	Interviews are state-law violations at most; they created motive not means and do not constitute an affirmative act for §1983	Accepted Plaintiffs’ allegation as plausible at 12(b)(6): interviews can be affirmative acts increasing risk; state-created-danger claim survives
Whether procedural due process claim exists for returning child to abusive custody	Returning Ta’Naejah to Crump without process effectively sentenced her to abuse, triggering procedural protections	DeShaney bars a constitutional right to state protection from private actors; no protected entitlement shown	Dismissed: procedural due process claim fails under DeShaney and related precedent
Monell municipal-liability plausibility	Repeated, multiple interviews by different caseworkers suggest an informal custom of interviewing victims with abusers, attributable to county	County policy and state regulation prohibit such interviews; allegations are limited to plaintiff’s case and insufficient to plead a municipal custom	Reversed dismissal as to Monell: at motion-to-dismiss stage facts permit reasonable inference of a custom; claim may proceed to discovery
Qualified immunity for individual caseworkers	Plaintiffs’ claims not clearly established; caseworkers reasonably relied on DeShaney	Plaintiffs point to settled Sixth Circuit law recognizing state-created-danger rights; deliberate-indifference alleged	Court: defendants forfeited developed qualified-immunity defense re interviews; right was clearly established in this circuit for state-created-danger claims, so immunity not resolved in their favor at this stage
Protective order / sealing / Rule 59 striking	Plaintiffs relied on deposition evidence (designated confidential) when seeking to amend; strike was improper	Defendants argued Plaintiffs violated the protective order; district court struck filings	Sixth Circuit vacated striking order as moot on merits, ordered Rule 59 filings unsealed, and denied motion to seal appellate brief (protective-order label insufficient to overcome strong public-access presumption)

Key Cases Cited

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1989) (general rule that state has no constitutional duty to protect individuals from private violence; outlines custody and limited-exception language)
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998) (state disclosure that substantially increases risk of private violence can constitute an affirmative act under state-created-danger theory)
Nelson v. City of Madison Heights, 845 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2017) (officer’s disclosure of informant status increased risk and supported state-created-danger claim; qualified immunity denied)
Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (elements of state-created-danger rule and focus on whether plaintiff was safer before the state action)
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1982) (recognition of substantive due process right to personal security and bodily integrity)
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires policy or custom causing deprivation)
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006) (collects DeShaney-line cases rejecting state-created-danger where conduct did not create/increase risk)
Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016) (strong presumption of public access to judicial records; protective-order labels do not justify sealing)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleading)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard and use of judicial experience/common sense)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (qualified-immunity framework)