Kevin Henson v. State of Indiana
86 N.E.3d 432
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Shortly after midnight on March 9, 2014, Kevin Henson, his son Daniel, and Charles Patterson drank alcohol and left to buy cocaine; Henson drove Daniel’s Honda with Patterson front passenger, Daniel rear seat.
- While arguing, Henson accelerated to ~60 mph, swerved across lanes into a Speedway station, drove over a curb, and struck gas pumps; the car flipped, causing explosions and ejecting Patterson and Daniel.
- Patterson suffered severe facial/head injuries requiring reconstructive surgery; Daniel suffered head, shoulder, and knee injuries; a bystander (Jasmine Simmons) was burned while rescuing her child.
- Henson’s BAC was .22; a vodka bottle was found in the car; the State charged multiple felonies and misdemeanors; jury convicted Henson of 12 felonies and one misdemeanor; the court imposed an aggregate 9 years + 60 days (1.5 years suspended).
- On appeal Henson raised: (1) double jeopardy under Indiana Constitution Art. 1, § 14; (2) sufficiency of evidence as to several convictions; and (3) whether his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Double jeopardy (multiple convictions for same act) | State: convictions for two battery counts (against Patterson) and battery + criminal recklessness (against Daniel) rest on distinct statutory elements but acknowledges overlap | Henson: multiple convictions derive from the same single act (driving into pumps) so violate Art. 1, § 14 under the actual-evidence test | Court: Reversed one Patterson battery (Count II) and one recklessness count (Count V as to Daniel); vacated those convictions and remanded because the evidentiary footprints were identical |
| Sufficiency of evidence for batteries and recklessness | State: evidence (speeding, swerving, statement "watch this," driving into pumps, ejections, injuries) supports intent/touching and deadly-weapon inference | Henson: no proof he actually "touched" victims; no specific intent to use vehicle as deadly weapon; jury not instructed on mens rea for deadly-weapon use | Court: Evidence sufficient — vehicle may constitute a deadly weapon; circumstantial evidence supported intent and touching; convictions (other than those vacated for double jeopardy) upheld |
| Jury instruction / mens rea re: vehicle as deadly weapon | State: jury was properly instructed that a motor vehicle may be a deadly weapon if used or intended to be used in a manner capable of causing serious injury | Henson: trial court should have sua sponte instructed that mens rea applies to use of vehicle as deadly weapon (specific intent required) | Court: No fundamental error; jury instruction given defined deadly weapon and allowed inference of intent; mens rea could be inferred from conduct |
| Sentence appropriateness under Ind. App. R. 7(B) | State: sentence within statutory ranges, court weighed aggravators (criminal history, multiple victims, pending case, risk to bystanders) and mitigators | Henson: sentence inappropriate given single brief act, positive employment, low risk, willingness to pay restitution | Court: Sentence not inappropriate; aggravators (extensive criminal history, substance abuse, pending warrant) supported the aggregate sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (establishes statutory-elements and actual-evidence tests for Indiana double jeopardy)
- Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2002) (actual-evidence test requires identical evidentiary footprint for all elements)
- Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 2008) (explains "reasonable possibility" standard under actual-evidence test)
- Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. 2013) (describes application of Richardson/Spivey framework)
- Matthews v. State, 476 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1985) (battery may be committed by a substance put in motion by defendant)
- Defries v. State, 342 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 1976) (discusses intent requirement for treating vehicle as a deadly weapon)
- Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (mental state may be inferred from conduct)