Kevin Don Foster v. State of Florida
258 So. 3d 1248
Fla.2018Background
- Kevin Don Foster, leader of the “Lords of Chaos,” was convicted of 1996 first‑degree murder of a teacher and sentenced to death; jury recommended death 9–3.
- Trial court found two aggravators: avoiding lawful arrest and CCP; rejected statutory and nonstatutory mitigation (including age—18).
- Foster’s direct appeal and initial postconviction proceedings were denied; death sentence became final in 2001.
- Foster filed successive 3.851 motions raising (1) that jury did not unanimously find elements of a purported “capital first‑degree murder” and (2) that being 18 at the time of the crime precludes death under evolving Eighth Amendment standards.
- Trial court summarily denied the successive motion; Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding Hurst and related jury‑unanimity sentencing requirements do not alter the substantive elements of first‑degree murder and Roper governs age ineligibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Foster) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury must unanimously find Hurst penalty‑phase findings as elements of a greater "capital first‑degree murder" offense | The sentence is invalid because conviction lacked unanimous findings of the Hurst/§921.141 penalty facts, which Foster characterizes as elements of a distinct higher offense | Hurst findings are penalty‑phase findings, not elements of the substantive crime; first‑degree murder is a capital felony by statute and was properly convicted at guilt phase | Rejected. Hurst findings are for sentencing after a conviction; they are not elements of first‑degree murder; due process/Eighth Amendment claims fail |
| Whether Hurst (and its unanimity requirement) applies retroactively to Foster | Hurst should apply to permit relief; jury unanimity now required to impose death | Hurst is not retroactive to cases final before Ring; Asay/Hitchcock foreclose retroactive application to Foster | Rejected. Hurst not retroactive to convictions final before Ring; prior precedent controls |
| Whether newly discovered scientific evidence about late‑adolescent brain development makes 18‑year‑olds ineligible for death | Scientific studies and national trends show 18–21 are developmentally like juveniles; evolving standards require extending Roper to age 21 | Roper establishes 18 as the Eighth Amendment cutoff; scientific research does not qualify as newly discovered evidence sufficient to change precedent | Rejected. Court adheres to Roper; similar claims previously rejected (Branch) |
| Whether summary denial of the Roper‑extension claim was erroneous | Newly discovered evidence warrants relief and reconsideration of death eligibility at 18 | Procedural and substantive precedent (Branch, Roper) bars expansion; evidence not newly discovered in the required sense | Rejected. Summary denial affirmed; no entitlement to relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2000) (direct‑appeal opinion describing facts and affirming conviction and sentence)
- Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2013) (postconviction appeal affirmance)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (holding judge‑found facts and advisory jury scheme violated Sixth Amendment)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida court requiring unanimous jury findings for death penalty imposition)
- Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016) (holding Hurst not retroactive to sentences final before Ring)
- Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2018) (reaffirming Asay retroactivity rule)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding Sixth Amendment requires jury, not judge, to find aggravating facts increasing penalty)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment bars death penalty for crimes committed under age 18)
- Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 2018) (rejected expansion of Roper to older young adults and treated brain‑development research as not newly discovered evidence)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (discussing juvenile sentencing distinctions under Eighth Amendment)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (barred life without parole for nonhomicide offenders under 18)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due‑process requirement that state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt)
- State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1990) (discussing due‑process proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2009) (standards for newly discovered evidence in postconviction proceedings)