Kevin Do v. First Financial Security
694 F. App'x 481
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (former First Financial sales contractors) sued First Financial asserting a class action for withheld commissions and invoked CAFA to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleged roughly 360 class members and asserted withheld commissions exceeding $12 million, but did not explicitly link Moua’s sales-network commission with each individual class member in the pleading.
- The district court dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice for failure to satisfy CAFA’s amount-in-controversy and also found Local Rule 23-2.2 class-definition pleading defects; dismissal was sua sponte on some grounds not raised by defendant.
- The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed dismissal as to the amount-in-controversy defect but held the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend.
- The majority found amendment not futile because plaintiffs could plausibly amend to allege (1) ~360 eligible sales contractors, (2) withheld commissions exceeding $12 million for them, and (3) that those contractors correspond to the individual class members.
- The Ninth Circuit rejected summary affirmance based on alleged appellate record defects and remanded with instruction to grant leave to amend; a partial dissent would have affirmed dismissal with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CAFA amount-in-controversy was adequately alleged | Plaintiffs asserted ~360 members and >$12M withheld commissions satisfy CAFA aggregate requirement | First Financial argued plaintiffs failed to connect the withheld commissions to the class members, so CAFA threshold not met | Amount-in-controversy allegation was deficient; dismissal on that ground was proper |
| Whether dismissal should be with or without leave to amend | Plaintiffs argued they could cure defects and plausibly allege the necessary connections and amounts | First Financial argued plaintiffs repeatedly failed to establish jurisdiction and dismissal with prejudice was warranted | District court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend; remand with instruction to grant leave to amend |
| Whether district court erred by sua sponte raising class-definition Local Rule defects | Plaintiffs argued they satisfied Local Rule 23-2.2 by alleging class definition and approximate size (260 in CA, ~100 outside) | First Financial did not raise the Local Rule ground | Ninth Circuit found the district court likely erred in applying Local Rule 23-2.2 to dismiss and that plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient for the rule |
| Whether appellate record deficiencies justified summary affirmance | Plaintiffs acknowledged minor record issues but argued they do not meet the high bar for summary affirmance | First Financial sought summary affirmance based on record inadequacy | Ninth Circuit declined to summarily affirm; minor appellate record issues insufficient for summary dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal with prejudice without leave to amend improper unless amendment clearly futile)
- Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (district court should give opportunity to cure defects when dismissing sua sponte)
- Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (same—opportunity to remedy perceived pleading defects)
- United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (district court abuses discretion when it commits legal error)
- In re O’Brien, 312 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard for summary dismissal on appellate procedural grounds)
- N/S Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 1997) (examples of substantial appellate violations warranting summary dismissal)
- Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court has wide discretion to grant or deny leave to amend)
- Heay v. Phillips, 201 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1952) (noting deference to district court’s denial of leave to amend after first amendment)
