840 F.3d 400
7th Cir.2016Background
- Illinois enacted a concealed‑carry licensing scheme permitting residents who meet statutory qualifications to carry concealed firearms; nonresidents may apply only if they reside in a state "substantially similar" to Illinois as determined by the Illinois State Police.
- "Substantially similar" is defined by regulation to require (1) public‑carry regulation, (2) mental‑health admission prohibitions like Illinois, (3) reporting denied persons to NICS, and (4) NLETs reporting; only four states qualified at the time.
- Plaintiffs are law‑abiding nonresident concealed‑carry licensees who seek the ability to apply for Illinois concealed‑carry licenses despite residing in nonapproved states.
- Plaintiffs challenged Illinois’ refusal to process their applications as violating Article IV privileges and immunities, the Second Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment; they sought a preliminary injunction.
- The majority affirmed denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding plaintiffs failed to show entitlement because Illinois lacks reliable means to verify and monitor nonresident applicants from most states; verification and ongoing monitoring needs justified Illinois’ categorical restriction.
- Judge Manion dissented: he would apply the heightened scrutiny articulated in Ezell/Moore, find the categorical ban both underinclusive and overinclusive, and would grant a preliminary injunction as plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois’ ban on processing most nonresident concealed‑carry applications violates the Second Amendment | Nonresidents (plaintiffs) contend the categorical denial burdens the core Second Amendment right of law‑abiding citizens and must survive exacting scrutiny; they seek only the opportunity to apply and be vetted | Illinois contends the ban is necessary to ensure reliable vetting and ongoing monitoring because it cannot access reliable out‑of‑state criminal and mental‑health records and lacks funds to obtain them | Majority: Denied preliminary relief — plaintiffs failed to show entitlement because Illinois has legitimate verification/monitoring concerns; Dissent: would apply exacting scrutiny and hold the ban fails tailoring requirement and is likely unconstitutional |
| Proper standard of review for a restriction on carrying arms in public | Plaintiffs: exacting heightened scrutiny (as in Ezell/Moore) because the ban burdens the core right of law‑abiding citizens | State: (implicitly) treated the restriction as reasonable and subject to rational basis in the majority analysis | Majority applied a deferential reasonableness inquiry for purposes of preliminary relief; Dissent insisted on Ezell/Moore heightened scrutiny and would apply it |
| Whether Illinois’ administrative/verification burdens justify the categorical restriction | Plaintiffs argue applicants could provide verified records or pay for checks; the ban is overinclusive and underinclusive | Illinois argues practical inability to obtain complete, reliable criminal/mental‑health data and to monitor licensees justifies limiting applicants to residents of substantially similar states | Majority: practical verification limits support upholding the denial of preliminary relief; Dissent: these administrative defenses are insufficiently tailored and alternatives exist |
| Preliminary injunction balancing of harms | Plaintiffs: inability to apply irreparably harms Second Amendment rights and injunctive relief is warranted if likely to succeed | State: public‑safety interests and inability to vet justify denying injunction; plaintiffs can still possess firearms in limited ways and in their home states | Majority: plaintiffs did not meet threshold to justify injunctive relief given verification concerns; Dissent: plaintiffs would likely succeed and balance of harms favors injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment incorporated against the states)
- Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (heightened scrutiny for laws burdening core Second Amendment rights; close fit/narrow‑tailoring required)
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (invalidating Illinois’ total ban on public carry; law‑abiding citizens entitled to carry in public)
- Berron v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming that law‑abiding, mentally healthy persons may carry loaded weapons in public)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (intermediate scrutiny accepted for firearm restriction on certain misdemeanants)