Kevin Calderone v. Michael Scott, 838 F.3d 1101

Four named employees sued Lee County Sheriff Michael Scott under the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.) and the Florida Minimum Wage Act (FMWA), alleging unpaid off-the-clock work.
District Court conditionally certified an FLSA § 216(b) collective action (opt-in) and sent notice; 64 additional plaintiffs opted in (68 total).
The District Court denied certification under Rule 23(b)(3) for the FMWA state-law class (opt-out), reasoning that overlapping opt-in and opt-out class actions are "mutually exclusive and irreconcilable," and relied on LaChapelle.
Plaintiffs sought permission to appeal the Rule 23 denial under Rule 23(f); the Eleventh Circuit granted interlocutory review.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed: § 216(b) does not preclude a contemporaneous state-law Rule 23(b)(3) class action; the court remanded for the District Court to adjudicate Rule 23(a)/(b)(3) requirements and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an FLSA § 216(b) collective action may proceed simultaneously with a state-law Rule 23(b)(3) class action	Plaintiffs: the FLSA's text and history do not bar concurrent state-law opt-out class actions; both can proceed together	Sheriff Scott: LaChapelle and practical conflicts make opt-in and opt-out class actions irreconcilable; overlap would cause confusion and inefficiency	Court: Reversed. § 216(b) does not preclude a concurrent Rule 23(b)(3) state-law class action; they may coexist.
Whether LaChapelle controls the outcome	Plaintiffs: LaChapelle addressed a different statute (ADEA) that expressly invoked § 216(b); it does not bar concurrent state-law class actions here	Sheriff Scott: District Court reasonably relied on LaChapelle to find mutual exclusivity	Court: LaChapelle is inapposite; the District Court misapplied it, so reliance constituted an abuse of discretion.
Whether case-management/confusion concerns justify denying Rule 23(b)(3) certification	Plaintiffs: separate tailored notices and scheduling can avoid confusion; courts routinely manage such issues	Sheriff Scott: overlapping notices and different opt-in/opt-out regimes will confuse class members and complicate proceedings	Court: Practical concerns are manageable; separate notices or scheduling adjustments mitigate confusion; not a compelling reason to deny certification.

LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (held ADEA enforcement had to follow § 216(b) opt-in scheme)
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (Sup. Ct.) (describing efficiency and benefits of collective/class actions)
Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.) (standard for § 216(b) "similarly situated" inquiry at certification)
Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir.) (standard of review for class-certification decisions)
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.) (Rule 23(a)/(b)(3) requirements explained)
Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir.) (opt-out class members are bound unless they affirmatively exclude themselves)
Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971 (7th Cir.) (district-court management can address notice confusion; concurrent actions permissible)
Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.) (discussing Portal-to-Portal Act history and § 216(b) opt-in rationale)
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (Sup. Ct.) (history of the 1966 Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out innovation)