Ketan Kumar v. Nirav C. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557

Background

At a Tampa bar, Kumar attacked Patel; Patel struck Kumar with a cocktail glass, causing permanent loss of sight in Kumar’s left eye.
State charged Patel with felony battery; Patel moved to dismiss under Florida’s Stand Your Ground statute and the circuit court granted immunity in the criminal case. That criminal immunity determination is final.
Kumar then sued Patel civilly for battery and negligence; Patel raised the criminal Stand Your Ground immunity as an affirmative defense and moved for summary judgment. The circuit court denied summary judgment and ordered an evidentiary immunity hearing in the civil case.
Patel petitioned the Second District for a writ of prohibition; the Second District held a criminal Stand Your Ground immunity determination binds in civil proceedings and granted the writ, certifying conflict with the Third District.
The Florida Supreme Court accepted review to resolve whether a criminal Stand Your Ground immunity finding controls civil liability and ultimately held that it does not.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Kumar)	Defendant's Argument (Patel)	Held
Whether a criminal Stand Your Ground immunity determination binds a subsequent civil suit	Criminal immunity should not bar civil suit because civil plaintiffs aren't parties to the criminal proceeding and collateral estoppel requires party mutuality	Criminal immunity under §776.032(1) grants immunity from civil action; one immunity determination should control both criminal and civil proceedings	Held: No—criminal immunity determination does not confer civil immunity or bind civil plaintiffs; separate civil determination required
Whether §776.032 unambiguously altered common-law collateral estoppel/mutuality requirements	Legislature did not clearly intend to modify collateral estoppel doctrine; silence on procedure supports separate civil determination	The statute’s grant of immunity "from criminal prosecution and civil action" indicates an intent to preclude civil suits following a criminal immunity finding	Held: No clear statutory intent to alter common-law mutuality; statute is silent on procedure and does not unambiguously change collateral estoppel
Effect of §776.032(3) attorney‑fee provision on interpretation of civil immunity	Fee provision implies civil immunity will be litigated and decided in civil court; otherwise subsection would be redundant	Fee provision can be read to refer to civil effect of an existing criminal immunity finding	Held: Read as supporting separate civil proceedings—the fees provision contemplates litigating civil immunity in civil court
Impact of later amendments (2017) altering burdens of proof	Different burdens for criminal (State must prove lack of immunity) and civil (preponderance for defendant) indicate separate proceedings; criminal finding cannot bind civil court	A prior criminal determination could still preclude litigation if binding; amendment shows intent to permit different standards but not to bind civil courts	Held: 2017 amendment reinforces that criminal findings cannot bind civil proceedings because standards differ

Key Cases Cited

Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456 (Fla. 2010) (describing Stand Your Ground immunity procedure and burden in criminal cases)
Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So.3d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (discussing civil Stand Your Ground evidentiary hearing)
Professional Roofing & Sales, Inc. v. Flemmings, 138 So.3d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (held criminal immunity does not bind civil plaintiff)
Patel v. Kumar, 196 So.3d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (Second District held criminal immunity controls civil liability; certified conflict)
Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2006) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (plain-meaning rule for statutes)
McGhee v. Volusia Cty., 679 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1996) (statute will not be read to modify common law absent clear intent)
Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1995) (discussing mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel)