Keryn Newman v. FERC, 22 F.4th 189

PATH was formed to build a regional transmission line and from 2009–2011 spent >$6 million on public relations, polling, advertisements, and lobbying to secure state Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity.
PATH booked those expenditures to Account 923 (Outside Services Employed) and Account 930.1 (General Advertising Expenses), which PATH’s formula rate passes through to customers; Account 426.4 (Expenditures for Certain Civic, Political and Related Activities) is excluded from PATH’s formula rate.
Petitioners (ratepayers) challenged PATH’s annual filings, arguing the expenditures belonged in Account 426.4 and thus were not recoverable from ratepayers.
An ALJ and the Commission initially agreed, placing the costs in Account 426.4 and ordering refunds (Opinion 554); on rehearing FERC reversed in Opinions 554‑A and 554‑B, holding the costs did not fall in Account 426.4 (treating the account as limited to direct influence and distinguishing RTO‑approved projects).
Petitioners sought review; the D.C. Circuit held that Account 426.4’s clause covering expenditures "for the purpose of influencing the decisions of public officials" includes indirect as well as direct influence, vacated Opinions 554‑A and 554‑B, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Petitioners' Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Account 426.4’s "decisions of public officials" clause covers indirect influence expenditures	Clause covers any expenditures made for the purpose of influencing officials, including indirect PR/advocacy	Clause should be limited to expenditures that directly influence officials to avoid swallowing the Public Opinion clause and to reasonably limit scope	Court: Clause is textually not limited to "direct" influence; includes indirect influence; PATH’s expenditures fall in Account 426.4
Whether the court should defer to FERC’s interpretation of the Uniform System of Accounts	No deference where FERC’s reading is plainly inconsistent with the regulation; textual/precedential analysis controls	FERC’s interpretation entitled to deference under Auer/Kisor; its limiting reading is reasonable	Court: FERC’s interpretation was plainly inconsistent with the regulation on the key clause, so no deference applied; court interprets the regulation itself
Whether Accounts 923 and 930.1 properly received the disputed expenditures (i.e., are residuals available)	Residual accounts cannot be used where Account 426.4 applies; 923/930.1 explicitly exclude items provided for elsewhere	923/930.1 are appropriate residual categories for these expenses	Court: 923 and 930.1 are residual and expressly exclude items covered by other accounts; because expenses belong in 426.4, they should not have been booked to 923/930.1

Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (establishes when deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule is appropriate)
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 577 U.S. 260 (2016) (discusses limits on agency interpretive breadth and when courts may imply limiting language)
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (courts should not permit agencies to create de facto new rules under guise of interpretation)
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (classic articulation of deference to agency interpretation of its own regulations)
Braintree Elec. Light Dep't v. FERC, 550 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (distinguishes recoverability under stated‑rate ratemaking from formula‑rate accounting)
United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007) (surplusage doctrine tolerates some redundancy rather than adopting textually dubious constructions)