Kerr v. OB/GYN ASSOCIATES OF SAVANNAH
314 Ga. App. 40
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Kerr, pro se, sues OB/GYN Associates of Savannah and individuals for injuries after a medical assistant allegedly allowed her to fall from an examination table following a vaccination.
- Trial court dismissed Kerr's complaint for failure to attach an expert affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) alleging medical negligence.
- Kerr appeals, arguing the claim is ordinary negligence and does not require an expert affidavit, not alleging negligence in vaccine administration itself.
- The appellate court reviews the dismissal de novo, evaluating whether the complaint, construed in Kerr's favor, shows a provable basis for relief.
- Court finds at least partly that the alleged negligent act—failing to prevent Kerr from falling—does not necessarily involve medical judgment and is ordinary negligence, thus not requiring expert affidavit for that aspect.
- Court affirms dismissal to the extent the complaint sought ordinary-negligence liability, but reverses to the extent Kerr alleged a viable ordinary-negligence claim against the assistant, and reverses denial of vicarious liability claims against OAS and Dr. Toraya for simple negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the fall-from-table claim is ordinary negligence requiring no expert affidavit | Kerr argues the act was ordinary negligence, not medical. | Defendants contend the claim involves medical questions requiring an expert affidavit. | Partial: fall claim is ordinary negligence; requires no expert affidavit for that aspect. |
| Whether vicarious liability for simple negligence should survive | Kerr sues OAS and Dr. Toraya based on the medical assistant's alleged negligence. | Defendants contend dismissal of vicarious-liability claims is proper if underlying negligence is not proven. | Reversed: vicarious liability claims for simple negligence should not be dismissed at this stage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chandler v. Opensided MRI of Atlanta, 299 Ga.App. 145, 682 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. App. 2009) (de novo standard for reviewing dismissal and factual conclusions)
- Brown v. Durden, 195 Ga.App. 340, 393 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. App. 1990) (distinguishing medical vs. ordinary negligence for limitations and expert proof)
- Jones v. Bates, 261 Ga. 240, 403 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. 1991) (distinguishing medical judgment from ordinary negligence in certain contexts)
- Health Mgmt. Assocs. v. Bazemore, 286 Ga. App. 285, 648 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. App. 2007) (analyzing when medical negligence requires expert proof)
- Candler Gen. Hosp. v. McNorrill, 182 Ga.App. 107, 354 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. App. 1987) (framework for distinguishing medical from ordinary negligence)
- Moore v. Louis Smith Mem. Hosp., 216 Ga.App. 299, 454 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. App. 1995) (non-medical handling of patient not constituting medical judgment)
- Brown v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 280 Ga.App. 847, 635 S.E.2d 184 (Ga. App. 2006) (analysis of medical vs. ordinary negligence boundaries)